THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In the

United States

, backers of the TTIP

must overcome substantial domestic resistance,

although it is still not clear whether or not it will

become a hot issue during the 2016 Presidential

election campaign. American congressmen on

both sides of the aisle have repeatedly expressed

their opposition to a “fast track” for interna-

tional trade agreements such as the TTIP or the

TTP - without which it is very difficult to negoti-

ate a meaningful deal. As many left-leaning

American voters believe that free trade agree-

ments endanger environmental protection, la-

bor rights, and import safety standards, Demo-

cratic representatives naturally tend to shy away

from political commitments on trade issues that

could erode their electoral base of support. Al-

though Republicans may support free trade at a

philosophical level, they could be reluctant to

support any agreement that would hand a po-

litical victory to President Obama. Furthermore,

the call for a renewal of trade promotion au-

thority (TPA) contained in President Obama’s

sixth State of the Union address delivered on

January 20, 2015 was not warmly received.

Obama’s request was fiercely opposed by Dem-

ocrats such as Harry Reid (majority leader of the

Senate at that time) on the grounds that sup-

port for fast-track approval would hurt Demo-

crats in the November 2014 midterm elections.

Since the Republicans have retaken control

of the Senate perspectives for a deal between

the President and the Congress on the TPA

have not improved, despite Republican preten-

sions to support free trade. Options for resolv-

ing the current gridlock include the possibility

of circumventing the fast-track system provid-

ed for in the Trade Act of 1974 by creating

specific ad hoc TPAs that covered only certain

countries and specific topics such as the envi-

ronment, labor rights, and health and giving a

higher profile to congressmen directly involved

in the negotiations. Nonetheless, given the

threat of severe recession now looming over

the US’s European allies, the political and secu-

rity implications of the TTIP agreement could

eventually trigger US bipartisan support for

making a deal.

By contrast, in

the European Union

geopolitical sense of urgency to rush to a final

agreement can be expected to arise in Europe in

the short term. The EU is not a geopolitical play-

er in the sense that the US, Russia, and China

have assumed that role. It has no

grand strategy

of dominion over others and continues to main-

tain a postmodern perspective on world order,

an attitude that will become even more deeply

entrenched while the Eurozone struggles to re-

cover and the current North-South gap within

Europe remains unabridged. It appears that

consensus on the desirability of a transatlantic

agreement will be more difficult to achieve in

Europe, where geopolitical positioning does not

have the importance it could be expected to as-

sume during ratification debates in the US Con-

gress.

Resistance in Europe to a liberalizing trade

pact can be largely attributed to the effects of

low growth rates, high unemployment (espe-

cially in states along the continent’s southern

periphery), a rise in protectionist sentiment, so-

cial unrest, and a general climate of political

disaffection. Despite official efforts to sell the

agreement as a mechanism for spurring growth

and restoring the European economy, public

awareness that current economic hardships are

largely the result of the economic and financial

integration that left European economies ex-

posed to the collateral effects of the American

Great Recession serves as a break on any at-

tempt to implement a “liberal” approach.