ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMMIGRATION: THE MEDITERRANEAN PERSPECTIVE
93
are the main source and transit route of migra-
tion flows is complemented by bilateral dia-
logues between Mediterranean and African
countries, providing a basis for a more flexible
approach that is tailored to suit local conditions.
At the same time, because the political and mi-
gration situations differ from country to coun-
try, as do the relationships between individual
countries and the EU, so too the framework
that governs these relationships must vary, giv-
ing rise to a range of situations.
In the southern Mediterranean, the EU has
reached agreements with Morocco, Tunisia,
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Libya. The EU has
Association Agreements with the first four. With
Morocco and Tunisia, these have given rise to a
whole range of instruments, including: Mobility
Partnerships; Dialogues on Migration, Mobility
and Security; Readmission Agreements; and
Visa Facilitation Agreements. These agreements
are still under negotiation with Egypt, although
an Association Agreement has been in place
since 2004. There has been an Association
Agreement with Jordan since 2002, a Dialogue
on Migration, Mobility and Security since 2012,
and a Mobility Agreement was signed in 2014.
In Lebanon and Libya the situation is different.
With Lebanon, a new EU-Lebanon Action Plan
for 2013–15 was adopted in 2014, replacing
the previous plan that ran from 2005 to 2010
and was revised in 2012. In July 2014, Lebanon
also submitted a formal request for a Dialogue
on Migration, Mobility and Security, which was
the subject of discussion between September
and October, and was launched in December.
The situation with Libya, as is to be expected
due to political volatility and growing insecurity,
has been far more complicated. Discussions with
this country go back to 2008, when negotiations
for a Framework Agreement between Libya
and the EU began, with the aim of including
provisions relating to migration, mobility, bor-
ders and international protection. In October
2010, a press statement about cooperation be-
tween the EU and Libya was agreed, covering
the issues of borders, mobility, migration and
asylum, followed by a meeting of senior officials
in February 2011. However, negotiation of the
Framework Agreement and subsequent discus-
sions based on the press statement were sus-
pended as a consequence of growing political
instability. The migration dialogue itself has
come to a standstill, giving way to instruments
that seek to alleviate a very complex situation.
In June 2013, the EU deployed a mission to
Libya under the European Common Security
and Defence Policy to support the Libyan au-
thorities in improving and developing the secu-
rity of the country’s borders. In December of the
same year, the Commission adopted a pro-
gramme worth 10 million euros to support a
human rights-based migration management
and asylum system in Libya. However, the inten-
sification of political conflict, growing insecurity
and the huge institutional crisis in the country
rendered any planning with regard to migration
and border control irrelevant.
In addition to these agreements between
the EU and the Mediterranean countries, the EU
has important bilateral agreements with coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Cape Verde,
Nigeria and South Africa. These types of agree-
ment are likely to become even more important
in the future, given that the sub-Saharan region
is such a major contributor to Mediterranean
migration. With respect to Cape Verde, a Special
Partnership Agreement was established in 2007,
with an EU migration mission visiting the coun-
try in May of that year. The Mobility Partnership
between the EU and Cape Verde was also
signed in the same year. In October 2014, Cape
Verde took a further step, ratifying Readmission