THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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negotiable condition for renewing a dialogue

that must be oriented towards a more compre-

hensive agreement that benefits the EU, Russia

and the border countries that lie between them.

The main objective is to ensure that the

ceasefire in the Donbas outlined in the Minsk II

agreement is thoroughly and permanently re-

spected so as to end the current humanitarian

crisis, attend the needs of the civil population

and lay the basic foundations for the next step

forward. Should there be violations of the

ceasefire, it will be necessary to up the pressure

on Kyiv and Moscow until both sides respect it.

Supplying arms to Ukraine would be not be best

way to achieve this goal, given that Russia

would most likely react by sending arms to the

rebels, unleashing an escalation of the conflict

that must be avoided in view of the severe con-

sequences it could entail. Our mission is not to

stoke the crisis, but rather to defuse it.

Whatever solution is finally agreed upon, it

must guarantee respect for the territorial integ-

rity of Ukraine, which theoretically should be

understood to include Crimea and Sevastopol,

both of which should revert to Ukraine in line

with international laws and treaties.

Nevertheless, as it would require a major politi-

cal turn of events in Moscow, it is not realistic to

hope for such an outcome. No proposal contin-

gent upon the reintegration of Crimea and

Sevastopol into Ukraine could ever succeed.

However, there is no reason for either Kyiv or

the EU to recognise their annexation to Russia.

Both can continue to defend their positions on

territorial integrity, but must be prepared to

keep working towards a peaceful solution even

though this objective is not achieved.

On the other hand, the reestablishment of

Kyiv’s control over the Donbass and the border

with Russia must be non-negotiable bargaining

points. Occupied zones cannot be allowed to

become frozen conflict points like Transnistria,

South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-

Karabakh. Reunification and the disarmament

of secessionist militias must include guarantees

that the populations of rebel areas will not be

subject to reprisals and that special statutes ac-

commodating local identities will be negotiated

for these zones. Although both of these condi-

tions have been enshrined in the Minsk II agree-

ments, convincing the Ukrainian Parliament to

approve them will not be easy. It is clear that

some kind of federal system would be the best

solution for a country with a divided identity.

However, for such an arrangement to work, the

Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as well as others

such as Kharkiv and Odessa would need to have

a significant degree of autonomy and the pos-

sibility of maintaining economic and cultural ties

with Russia without jeopardising the political

unity of the country.

The stabilisation of Ukraine and the normal-

isation of relations with Russia hinge on an ad-

ditional key condition: the renunciation of

Ukraine’s plans to join NATO. Putin has probably

already assimilated the idea that he cannot

count on Ukraine to become a member of the

Eurasian Union and that this country’s align-

ment with the EU is irreversible. He has no op-

tion other than to accept these facts. However,

Ukraine’s integration into the Atlantic Alliance

would be perceived in Moscow as a major threat

to Russian security and provoke tensions that

could lead to new cold war. Non-NATO EU

states such as Finland that do not have security

problems serve as precedents. Neutrality is the

best stance for a border country with a divided

identity like Ukraine to take. Its security, like that

of other Eastern Partnership countries, must be

guaranteed within the framework of a definitive