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Wladimir van Wilgenburg
After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Iraqi Kurdish administration was
recognized by the Iraqi constitution, and the Kurds fought together with the Americans
against the Iraqi army. In 2006, the PUK and KDP reached a political agreement to
share power, and the administrations were slowly unified under the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) banner. Moreover, the Kurdish parties promised to integrate and
unify their security apparatus, and to form a non-partisan force. However, in reality the
Kurdish territories and security forces and intelligence remain de-facto divided between
the PUK and the KDP. Both the KDP and the PUK used the Peshmergas as a vehicle for
patronage and electoral support. As a result, the professionalism of the Peshmerga forces
was severely weakened due to the corruption and nepotism of the PUK and KDP, and
many Peshmerga fighters were untrained or were employed as ghost soldiers, receiving
cash salaries while not serving as Kurdish soldiers (House of Commons Defence
Committee, January 2015: 28). Furthermore, many of them had to pay for their own
bullets and weapons (Knights, January 2015: 36).
PUK dissidents in 2009 founded the Change Movement modelled on Barack Obama’s
presidential “Change” campaign to combat this corruption (ICG 2015: 6). The party
wanted to reform the KRG and end corruption and political patronage within the two
parties. Until 2014, the party played the opposition role in the KRG parliament, and in
2014 it joined the Kurdish government, receiving the Minister of Peshmerga portfolio in
June 2014 (Knights, January 2015: 35).
Turkish versus Iranian competition
Meanwhile, the KDP and PUK maintained their own foreign policies. While the
KDP has built better economic ties with Turkey, the PUK was forced to build ties with
Iran since all of its territories border the Iranian state. As a result, the PUK Peshmerga
forces supported an Iranian-backed assault of Shia militias to break the Islamic state siege
of Amerli on August 31, 2014 (ICG 2015: 22). Moreover, the PUK has adopted a more
conciliatory approach towards Baghdad than the KDP, which pursued a policy to make the
Kurdistan region more independent from Baghdad by exporting oil independently through
Turkey. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan also backed Barzani’s quest to unseat
Maliki (ICG 2015: 14). However, due to the lack of Turkish support when Islamic State
attacked Kurdistan in August, Barzani was forced to request Iranian military help (
Ibid
.).
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to cooperate with the KDP and Turkey’s Special Forces
started to train the KDP Peshmerga forces in November (Hurriyet, November 2014).
Furthermore, Turkey continued to support Barzani as a counterweight to the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), whose affiliate, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), controlled
most Kurdish areas in Syria after Assad’s forces pulled out from most Kurdish cities, apart
from Hasakah city and Qamisli (ICG 2015: 14). As a result, the PUK now heavily backs
PKK-affiliates in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The PKK also started to play a more prominent
role after the KDP Peshmergas fled Sinjar in August, after YPG and PKK fighters coming
from neighbouring Syria evacuated thousands of Yezidis (Hawramy, December 2014).
Moreover, the PKK sent fighters to repell Islamic State in Kirkuk, and Makmur (Hawar