The Kurdish question and the fight against Islamic State
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The Syrian civil war and the fight against IS is further complicated by the political
situation and peace in Turkey (BBC, July 27 2015). In July 2015, a suicide bombing
perpetrated by IS killed at least 32 activists in the town of Suruc who were preparing to
help the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane. Kurds blamed the government for the attack and
killed two policemen in response. This resulted in Turkish airstrikes targeting the PKK in
northern Iraq, killing several fighters and even civilians, ending the fragile peace that had
lasted for at least two years. Moreover, Turkey returned fire on IS forces, after they killed a
Turkish soldier on the border on July 23, 2015 (Reuters, July 23 2015). This followed talks
with US officials, which gave the US permission to use Turkey’s Incirlik airbase to attack
IS militants (Guardian, July 23 2015). But Turkey said it would not only target IS but also
the PKK, thus complicating the fight against IS in Syria.
Turkey also said it would go ahead with plans to create an IS-free safe zone in northern
Syria to prevent YPG expansion from Kobane to Afrin and to protect rebels from IS. Turkey
reportedly wants the last remaining IS strongholds along the Syrian-Turkish border to
be occupied by FSA rebels, and become a safe area for refugees who are still streaming
into Turkey (Daily Sabah, July 27 2015). This is strongly opposed by the PKK and the
PYD, which fear Turkish plans to undermine their Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Earlier,
on July 24, Turkish tanks fired at YPG positions to prevent them from taking Jarabulus
(YPGRojava.com, August 1 2015), which is intended to be part of the future safe-zone
planned by Turkey. This shows that more problems will soon erupt between the Kurds
in Syria, and Turkey. This will also complicate efforts by the anti-IS coalition and the
US to defeat Islamic State, since the Kurdish territories all border IS positions in Syria.
Furthermore, more violence is expected inside Turkey with the PKK targeting the police
forces and military targets.
Conclusion
The Kurds continue to be stateless, but enjoy more political autonomy than in the
past. They have also received increasing support after Islamic State’s miscalculated
attacks against them in both Iraq and Syria. The Kurds have thereby become the leading
ground forces against IS, receiving airstrike support from the US; and even training and
weapons in Iraq. However, the end of the peace process in Turkey will make it more
difficult to defeat Islamic State in Syria. Turkey fears a Kurdish semi-state on its borders
with Syria, whilst the YPG and the PKK have to fight simultaneously both IS and the
Turkish state – this being one of Islamic State’s key objectives. Without any agreement
between the Kurds and Ankara, it will be more difficult for the anti-IS coalition to destroy
IS in Raqqah, since the Kurds control most territories close to the city. There could
also be future clashes between Turkish-backed rebel groups and the Kurds in Syria over
disputed territories. Additionally, Kurdish disunity in Iraq over the future of the KRG
presidency could threaten the stability of Iraqi Kurdistan, and damage the Iraqi Kurdish
image as a democratic Kurdish semi-state.