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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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area around Aleppo and the Turkish shelling of
YPG positions near the city of Azaz, the Febru-
ary 19 was not met. In the wake of this debacle,
US President Barak Obama and Russian Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin thrashed out a definitive
ceasefire agreement excluding IS and the ANF
that was subsequently accepted by all parties
implicated in the conflict and entered into force
on midnight on the night of February 26. Apart
from isolated incidents between Syrian govern-
ment troops and groups belonging to the HNC,
this ceasefire was reasonably respected for the
several days during which humanitarian aid was
delivered to 384,000 people in 12 of the 18 be-
sieged zones of the country. This paved the way
for the beginning of a second round of Geneva
III talks on March 14, which unfortunately end-
ed on Wednesday the 24 without any progress
having been achieved. Russia’s March 14 an-
nouncement of a partial withdrawal of its troops
from Syria should provide impetus for further
negotiations slated to take place on April 9-10
despite the Syrian government’s desire to post-
pone the next round until legislative elections in
the zones it controls scheduled for April 13 have
concluded. Reaching an agreement will be dif-
ficult given the broad spectrum of positions and
interests of the parties involved. Nevertheless,
this must be accomplished so that all may con-
centrate their efforts on defeating the various
jihadist groups active throughout the country
(first and foremost IS) that constitute a common
enemy and the most serious threat to collective
security.
The limitations of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy
The Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) of the EU has demonstrated its weaknesses
once more in Syria and in the fight against ji-
hadism beyond our borders in general. Europe
is the first and foremost part of the world af-
fected by the Syrian war beyond the Middle
East. It is the target of IS-sponsored terrorism
and is staggering under the burden of massive
waves of refugees fleeing the conflict. Further-
more, based on past experience, it is very likely
that Europe will be obliged to pay the lion’s
share of the cost of reconstruction. Neverthe-
less, it is playing a secondary role in the resolu-
tion of this conflict from a political as well as a
military perspective. Once again, it has been the
U.S. and Russia that have negotiated and de-
cided how things shall be either because the EU
lacks a common voice to represent it or has that
voice but prefers not to use it whilst Member
States act individually as each one sees fit and
consequently end up being irrelevant to the pro-
cess. Although the High Representative for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy will present a
global strategy for EU foreign affairs and secu-
rity to the European Council in June 2016, no
real progress towards this end will be achieved
without the firm will of Member States to act
collectively on the international stage.
The CFSP, as it stands today, is not making an
effective contribution to European security and
the fight against jihadism. Despite the fact that
this is a situation that affects all parties equally,
Member States are intervening militarily in Iraq
and Syria individually, coordinating their actions
either on a bilateral basis or through US chan-
nels, without a joint plan or a proper rationalisa-
tion or distribution of tasks. The establishment
of a permanent EU command structure such as
an EU Operational Headquarters could at least
permit the coordination of actions being carried
out simultaneously by various MSs in the same
theatre of operations and optimise the efficien-
cy of each one’s contributions. Without critically