Background Image
Table of Contents Table of Contents
Previous Page  56 / 150 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 56 / 150 Next Page
Page Background

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

56

The transition between the Obama and

Trump presidencies has supposed an unprece-

dented and radical shift. The political principles

and agenda of the present administration will

give form to a new Trump Doctrine that will un-

doubtedly entail a 180-degree change of tack

on the country’s longstanding alliances with

Europe (NATO) and Asia (Japan and South

Korea), relationships with Russia and China and

positions on global governance in areas such as

trade, terrorism, migration and climate change.

Trump’s plans do not appear to involve the im-

plementation of a policy of isolationist retrench-

ment but rather a presidential display of his

much-vaunted talent for striking deals, first with

Russia and China, but eventually with European

countries, other regional powers and emerging

economies as well, in what could amount to a

new division of the world. His professed inten-

tion is to strike a “better deal” for the United

States based on burden sharing that will reduce

the need for US interventionism going forward.

Part and parcel of this convulsive start has

been Trump’s lack of prior political experience,

which has hindered his ability to piece together

a coherent policy, much less a strategy for its

implementation. Senate confirmation hearings

exposed differences of opinion between the

new president and various members of his cab-

inet such as Michael Flynn (forced to step down

from his position as national security advisor al-

most immediately due to his links to the Russian

government) as well as Secretary of State Rex

Tillerson and Defence Secretary James Mattis

(neither of whom completely shares Trump’s

outlook on NATO, Russia, China, Iran and the

Middle East). The first steps taken by the new

administration signal a curtailment of the free

trade policies and active support for Western

democracy that have served as the paradigm for

US foreign and security policy for the last seven

decades. As presently articulated, Trump’s

“American First” stance is poised to rupture a

bipartisan consensus that has guided world af-

fairs since the end of the Second World War.

The new president vaunted an impressive array

of (albeit mostly regressive) actions and initia-

tives during his first state of the union address

on 28 February that included an executive order

clearing the way for the construction of the

Keystone XL and Dakota pipelines, the US with-

drawal from the TTP, a stop entry order blocking

travel from seven predominantly Muslim coun-

tries to the US, the negotiation of pledges from

companies such as Ford and General Motors to

invest in US-based installations, the presenta-

tion of plans for a wall along the US-Mexican

border, the imminent renegotiation of the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an

upcoming major cut in corporate tax rates and

a proposal for legislation to fund a trillion-dollar

national infrastructure programme.

A divided Europe under the shadow of

Brexit

For the EU, 2016 was a year of relative stability

during which it managed to contain the worst

effects of the economic and refugee crises it

had been mired in for some time. The general

sense of calm was nevertheless marred by dis-

turbing developments on a number of fronts

that threatened European well-being and cohe-

sion. The first was a wave of concern for public

security provoked by a series of terrorist attacks

perpetrated in Paris in November 2015 and

heightened by another attack in Brussels in

March 2016, both of which put security forces

throughout the EU on high alert. Another was a

deteriorating social and economic climate marked

by a festering rise in inequality that fuelled the