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THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: THE END OF AN ERA
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new pact will be implemented provisionally as
of April 2017 until ratified by member states.
How well the agreement functions in practice
may well determine what goes into any future
TTIP agreement and the way in which it is likely
to be negotiated. Of particular importance will
be whether safeguard clauses guarantee states
the flexibility they need to protect vulnerable
domestic sectors, labour rights and environmen-
tal standards are respected and “losing” sectors
are provided with sufficient levels of social pro-
tection and professional support. Of further in-
terest to any future revival of TTIP negotiations is
the City of London’s plan to negotiate a post-
Brexit bilateral agreement with Washington.
Given that a treaty of this nature cannot be
signed prior to Great Britain’s formal exit from
the EU, nothing along these lines can be expect-
ed to take place until at least March 2019.
The end of multilateralism: bilateral pacts with
Russia and China
Transatlantic relations are also very likely to be
altered by policy shifts driven by Trump’s desire
to frame China rather Russia as the primary rival
of the United States, an objective based on the
perception that China will be in a unique posi-
tion to challenge US economic and geopolitical
supremacy at whatever point in the twenty-first
century its growing economic power translates
into advanced military capacity and global po-
litical clout. This U-turn in US policy is part of a
greater Trump administration strategy for or-
chestrating a new division of the world, which
might possibly entail a “New Yalta” or a “New
Reykjavik” along the lines of the historic meet-
ings that took place between Roosevelt and
Stalin in 1945 and Reagan and Gorbachov in
1986. Trump may regard a closer relationship
with Russia not only as a means of gaining an
ally in the fight against ISIS and stabilising the
eastern flank of Europe, but also, and perhaps
more fundamentally, as a lever for weakening
China, which could be relatively isolated and
contained if the two countries were to view it as
a common competitor in Asia. An opportunity
for closer detente with Washington could be
very attractive to Putin, in that it would allow
Russia to wriggle its way out of the isolation and
the sanctions it has had to deal with since its
annexation of Crimea, balance the pressure ex-
erted by the EU regarding its aggression in
Crimea and failures to embrace democratic
practices at home and make him an essential
partner in the resolution of problems in hot
spots such as Iraq, Syria and Ukraine. One of the
bigger dividends of such an arrangement for
the Kremlin would be the strengthening of
Russia’s position in the standoff in Ukraine:
should the US stop providing unconditional sup-
port to Kiev, Ukraine could drift back into the
Russian sphere of influence. All it would take for
this to occur is a decision on the part of the US
to lift the sanctions it has imposed on Russia
and tweak the terms by which the Minsk II
agreement is implemented – especially those
pertaining to the Dombass – in Moscow’s fa-
vour.
Trump does not appear to be interested in
maintaining Obama’s Asian pivot strategy, pre-
ferring instead to strike a “grand bargain” with
China for which he is likely to draw red lines on
two issues: a change in China’s monetary policy
geared towards reducing the US trade deficit
with that country and the abandonment of the
Asian giant’s island-building venture in the South
China Sea.
Paradoxically, his decision to pull the
US out of the TTP agreement will diminish US
influence in the Pacific to the enormous benefit
of China. Trump’s initial direct and indirect moves