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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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these movements take a less hard-line approach
that is not dominated by short-term objectives.
The most important aspect of this in Euro-
pean terms is that the EU has been forced to
clarify that unilateral independence within the
EU is impossible, among other reasons because
Article 4 of the Treaty of Lisbon (included by the
Convention on the European Constitution and
retained unaltered in the Treaty) obliges Brussels
to respect the constitutional and territorial or-
ganization of member states.
As a result, Catalan nationalists have come
up against the barrier of European rejection,
which has probably been the strongest argu-
ment against their separatist project and estab-
lishes a “political jurisprudence” that will serve
as a warning to any who consider setting out on
a similar path in the future.
Returning to the United Kingdom, it seems
certain that Scottish nationalism will renew its
calls for a second independence referendum in
the event of the UK as a whole voting in favour
of Brexit (and Scotland voting to remain). In this
situation, it would be almost impossible for Lon-
don to refuse demands for another referendum,
and the likelihood is that Scotland would vote
for independence in protest at being dragged
out of the EU against its will.
The campaign for Brexit also presents an ex-
ample of another kind of nationalism, this time
blended with Euroscepticism, in the form of the
populist arguments put forward by the Leave
campaign, which includes UKIP and a large
chunk of the Conservative Party. The EU refer-
endum of 23 June 2016, following on from the
Brussels deal, will be a key test of whether those
in favour of continued membership of the EU
are able to prevail over anti-European discourse.
There is also a third kind of nationalism that
has surfaced in the EU during 2015, one that is
associated with anti-Brussels populism. From
Tsipras in Greece, to Orbán in Hungary, and in-
cluding Kaczynski in Poland and Marine Le Pen
in France, extremist parties have repeatedly
sought to contrast national sovereignty with EU
decisions, presenting the Union as an external
actor that interferes with the decisions of indi-
vidual countries in an unacceptable manner,
whether to impose economic policies or to dis-
tort their political structures.
In every case, the EU has remained firm in
the exercise of its competencies, and it can be
argued that it has emerged as the winner from
this debate. The case of Greece is the clearest,
with the 13 July agreement between Athens
and Brussels and the subsequent implementa-
tion of this agreement by the Syriza govern-
ment.
Nationalist discourse does not appear to
have led to an increase in Euroscepticism during
2015. According to the European Parliament’s
2015
Parlameter
, the number of interviewees
who believe that their country has benefited
from membership of the EU is higher than ever
before; a majority believe that what unites
member states is more important than what di-
vides them; and, finally, the EU is perceived as
being best placed to respond to the conse-
quences of the economic and financial crisis.
However, it is important not to forget that
far-right populist parties, which have made sig-
nificant electoral progress and are now in gov-
ernment in a number of member states, count
an anti-European stance as a core element of
their programme. The mainstream parties
should respond by placing pro-European dis-
course at the centre of their programmes, in-
stead of watering it down or concealing it,
something that happens all too frequently.
At the same time, it is important to be aware
that Euroscepticism is directly related to the
harsh daily realities of the economic crisis. As