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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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problem lies in the control of the intergovern-
mental institutions that are not fully integrated
into the community acquis. The supervision of
the EIB is substantially less than what is exer-
cised over the ECB and in the case of the ESM,
there is zero oversight at the present time.
The problems of parliamentary oversight are
greater when we discuss the role of the Euro-
group, the financial rescues, the revision of the
Union’s fiscal framework and, in general, all
those issues that accentuated the intergovern-
mental profile in the last term. The Eurogroup’s
growing power within the framework of Euro-
zone policy has shaped a de facto institution
that is in need of an institutional framework
under the community method. True, the Parlia-
ment came to an agreement with the Euro-
group president on periodical appearances, but
it is also true that the current framework of rela-
tions does not include the possibility of making
written questions to increase that oversight, or
other measures. That lack of institutionalisation
allowed the negotiation and monitoring of the
rescues to take place outside the scope of the
Parliament, even though it has written several
reports on their implementation.
In the same vein is the reinforcement of the
Commission’s role in the monitoring of the
Member States’ budgetary policy, which was
agreed through ordinary regulation, but also
through an intergovernmental Treaty outside
the community method. The current model of
the European Semester, the framework that
oversees the conduct of the States, has limited
accountability to the Parliament.
An attempt is being made in the current
term to partially reverse these problems of dem-
ocratic legitimacy. On the one hand, a working
group has been formed in the Parliament to in-
crease that supervisory capacity, but it is un-
doubtedly all way too little until the Eurogroup
is successfully integrated into the institutions.
On the other, the Commission has revised the
Parliament’s role through a reform of the Euro-
pean Semester calendar, allowing greater inter-
action, but again this change does not go far
enough, suffering from the absence of a genu-
ine European fiscal policy subject to parliamen-
tary control that is complemented with its State-
by-State application under the supervision of
the national parliaments. It is hard for the Parlia-
ment to play a more significant role when the
issue is to try to watch over the action of the
national governments in the absence of a fully
European fiscal policy. In a way, European fiscal
policy at the present time is, unfortunately, the
sum of the national guidelines supervised by the
Commission.
Conclusions
The European Parliament has certain shortcom-
ings, but also important assets, both in the leg-
islative sphere and in its oversight capacity. Its
scope in the legislative procedure on economic
affairs, even though it appears limited, encom-
passes the same areas as those that are not sub-
ject to unanimity in the Council, in other words,
the same ones over which the Union does not
have real power outside the agreement of all
the Members.
Legislative initiative is somewhat reduced,
but, like the European Council, it can ask the
Commission to begin the legislative procedure
of any proposal. In the area of oversight, its su-
pervisory activity over the Commission is greater
than seen in our country, for example, and,
moreover, though somewhat vaguely, it can
monitor the work of the President of the Euro-
pean Council, an examination of the “office
of Head of State” that does not exist in other