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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

102

sibility in case of overrun of deadlines.

– Stricter requirements for asylum seekers:

they would be obliged to apply for asylum in

their country of first arrival. If they do not

meet this obligation, the responsible mem-

ber state must assess their asylum applica-

tion in an accelerated process. Asylum seek-

ers should only receive benefits in kind in the

member state responsible for their asylum

process (except for emergency medical treat-

ment). Failure to carry out these duties

would incur sanctions, which remain in the

hands of the member states.

Despite all these proposals, the Dublin

System essentially retains the principle that the

countries of first arrival in the EU must still

shoulder a particularly large burden, and are

responsible for admitting asylum seekers, and

sending them on for relocation or returning

them to safe third countries. This means that

Dublin IV is only a light “alteration which re-

mains in previous logic” (Hruschka, 2016) rath-

er than an “initiative for necessary reform to

achieve a more functional and efficient sys-

tem” (

ibid

). Until now, no consideration has

been given to differentiated proposals for

stronger involvement of asylum seekers them-

selves (“free choice”, “limited choice”, “Dublin

minus”, see Maiani, 2016). Repeated demands

have been made to include family and social

bonds, language skills, job matching and other

criteria for asylum seeker selection, to provide

positive incentives for asylum seekers to stay in

their allocated country, and to open up the

possibility of internal mobility within Europe

through the mutual recognition of asylum pro-

cesses (Wagner

et al

., 2016, Guild

et al

., 2015a:

10 on). The proposal also significantly cuts the

rights guaranteed in the Dublin III regulation

and includes new sanctions for irregular

onward migration (Maiani, 2016; Hruschka,

2016).

EASO will become a fully-fledged agency. It

can contribute to greater convergence between

the member states in the future. The relation-

ship between the agency and member states is

to be changed: exchange of information is to

become obligatory in future, rather than a form

of voluntary cooperation as previously. In future,

EASO should regularly check the member states’

list of safe countries of origin, pass on informa-

tion about countries that a member state wants

to add to the shared list, and create guidelines

on best practices for the implementation of the

CEAS. EASO should also provide tailored sup-

port for individual member states. The agency

should also use its teams to carry out operative

and technical tasks of CEAS implementation in

the member states, particularly those under a

high level of pressure from migration. EASO is

gradually expanding to become an asylum

agency that could implement harmonised ap-

plication of common rules in the member states,

even if not requested to do so, and if a member

state lacks the necessary ability or will, it could

intervene independently. This development may

offer an opening, and even the European

Commission sees it as a “long-term opportuni-

ty” (European Commission, 2016). The aim

would then be to gradually eliminate the differ-

ences in admission rates, which should not exist

according to the specification of the CEAS, and

thus end the asylum lottery that has previously

existed in Europe. However, until now, the

agency has only had competences for support-

ing process implementation, and it has not been

able to implement the processes itself. Despite

their increased importance, Frontex and EASO

still only play a support role for national border

and asylum authorities. A real EU asylum agency

is thus still not in view.

In addition to the improved competences for