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EU REFUGEE POLICY IN CRISIS
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bution and return. However, it would then be
urgent to ensure that the agreed EU standards
were observed, quick asylum processes were
implemented, and adequate treatment and pro-
tection were guaranteed. This also includes
identifying the people that require special treat-
ment during admission or processes. Vulnerable
persons must be treated appropriately.
Fingerprints must be taken without the use of
force (Guild
et al
., 2015), and detention must
only be used as a last resort (ECRE, 2016). There
is a need for a strict monitoring system led by
international organisations, NGOs and inde-
pendent agents such as an ombudsman to
check that the hotspots function in accordance
with European standards. The link between the
hotspots and the poor functioning of the Dublin
System is clear. A new edition of this system is
due shortly.
A new edition of the Common European
Asylum System (CEAS)
The CEAS, first reformed in 2013, proved itself
to be entirely insufficient under pressure from
increased immigration in 2015 (Mouzourakis,
2016; Wagner
et al
., 2016; Türk, 2016). Large
divergences in admission, the asylum procedure
and finally admission rates continued or even
increased, as the rising number of people arriv-
ing triggered a “race to the bottom”. This re-
sulted in a lowering of standards and stricter
barriers to entry. The European Commission had
started 40 infringement procedures relating to
transposition and implementation of CEAS di-
rectives, but these could hardly have any effect
before the European Commission started a revi-
sion of the directives and regulations of the
CEAS. The aim of this new reform is to speed up
the asylum process and harmonise standards
across the EU. As these comprehensive reforms
are currently still at the negotiation phase, this
text can only include a brief overview of the
most important elements proposed so far in the
upcoming third edition of the CEAS.
The European Commission suggested a new
edition of the much-criticised Dublin System
right from the start. Alternative proposals for a
fair distribution of asylum seekers among mem-
ber states appeared in an initial communication,
but it proved impossible to implement them.
While the European Parliament recommended a
thorough overhaul, the Visegrád group categor-
ically rejected it. The Commission finally opted
for a less ambitious version of a “Dublin plus”
system, with the following key aims:
– Transforming the previously temporary relo-
cation system into a permanent “corrective
allocation mechanism” – a distribution sys-
tem based on population size and GDP,
which would automatically come into force,
as soon as a member state had admitted
150 per cent of the number of asylum seek-
ers allotted to it. The figure of 150 per cent
was one of the most controversial proposals,
as this threshold would once more place the
asylum systems of countries of first arrival
under excessive strain, and cement the no-
tion of an “emergency mechanism” rather
than a proactive distribution system.
– Introduction of a system for financial balanc-
ing or penalties – a “financial solidarity
mechanism”. If member states refused to
admit asylum seekers, this system would
force them to pay 250,000 euros for each
asylum seeker that would otherwise have
been allotted to this member state within
twelve months.
– Stricter requirements for member states:
particularly a restriction of the member state
sovereignty clause and no shifting of respon-