100 / 150
THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
100
such as EASO, Europol and Eurojust in a coordi-
nating role, for registration, resettlement and
return of refugees and migrants arriving there.
A reserve pool of 1,500 quick-deployment
border guards was formed, to be operational
within five days. This measure came in response
to the fact that Frontex had previously had dif-
ficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of local
border guards from member states. Article 13
of the new regulation states that the EBCG is
responsible for a common vulnerability assess-
ment – carrying out a sort of stress test of the
external border to identify gaps in borders be-
fore crises arise. The border guards are also in-
tended to prevent irregular border crossings,
return migrants, and rescue shipwrecked per-
sons. The EBCG at the same time has the com-
petence of placing liaison officers in member
states. Deployment of these liaison officers is
initially planned in Turkey, then in the West
Balkans and Niger.
Observers and academics were astounded
above all by the expanded right of the “Agency
2.0” to act in member states with external bor-
ders without the need for the consent of the
affected country in extreme situations. This
right, which has far-reaching effects on the sov-
ereignty of member states, comes as a result of
experiences with Greece. Other member states
found this country’s external border protection
to be too lax during the so-called refugee crisis.
In situations at external borders requiring ur-
gent action due to a threat to the Schengen
Area, the agency can organise and coordinate
immediate deployments to secure borders, send
European Border and Coast Guard teams from
the immediate deployment pool, and where
necessary deploy additional European Border
and Coast Guard teams. It can send such teams
to support the migration authorities in hotspots,
and coordinate activities on external borders for
one or more member states, including joint ac-
tions with neighbouring third countries.
However, it is doubtful that affected member
states will really submit to this new mechanism.
This is closely linked to the observation that the
newly formed agency will have to maintain a
difficult balance between national sovereignty
and supranational elements.
Initial academic assessments (Rijpma, 2016;
Carrera
et al
., 2017) have already revealed that
the reformed agency is no supranational body:
the new ordinance does not create an original
“European” border and coast guard, nor does it
give the agency command and control capabili-
ties over personnel appointed at a national lev-
el. The EBCG does not replace national border
protection organisations, it does not have the
right to intervene or impose the law, and ulti-
mately it cannot guarantee uniform application
of the Schengen Borders Code. It still has
“shared responsibility” with member states for
the implementation of European integrated
border management. This question of compe-
tences is closely linked to the question of ac-
countability for decisions and actions: who has
the ultimate responsibility in case of doubt? This
issue is particularly relevant in terms of guaran-
teeing refugee rights and upholding human
rights.
Unlike the Frontex reform, the hotspot solu-
tion on the Italian and Greek islands was one of
the EU measures introduced during the crisis.
However, the system only started up gradually.
Not only did it lack an efficient way to assign
staff from other member states; it was also par-
ticularly lacking in human rights standards for
admission, access to the asylum system, and
questions relating to detention, identification
and treatment of vulnerable persons and unac-
companied minors. Hotspots might remain on
external borders as hubs for registration, distri-