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EU REFUGEE POLICY IN CRISIS
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countries. There has also been a debate for
years now regarding whether the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (also known
as the 1951 Refugee Convention) is still relevant
65 years after they were passed, and how inter-
national law on refugees can also take into ac-
count reasons for seeking asylum that were not
included in the 1951 Refugee Convention. At
the global political level, all eyes are currently
focused on Europe’s response to the so-called
refugee crisis. It also has a bearing on Europe’s
credibility when it calls for refugees’ rights to be
respected at the global level.
Faced with considerable secondary migra-
tion, the responsible decision-makers in Brussels
are increasingly aware of the paramount need
to cooperate with the countries of first arrival,
which have admitted the greatest proportion of
refugees over recent years. Ultimately, develop-
ing countries host 86 per cent of refugees
worldwide, although they often do not have
adequate access to international protection
(UNHCR 2015). Protracted stays in refugee
camps – lasting 18 years on average – and a lack
of resources among countries of first arrival are
also push factors for onward migration, often in
the direction of Europe. The EU has also identi-
fied partner countries of origin, transit and first
arrival in Africa, with which it is keen to make
“migration pacts”, “compacts” or “migration
partnerships”. Instruments from development
cooperation, the Common Foreign and Security
Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy
(CFSP/CSDP) overlap more than ever with asy-
lum, refugee and migration policies, which orig-
inally come under Justice and Home Affairs.
Both initially claim to focus on tackling the rea-
sons causing people to seek asylum. However,
the aim is also to stem the flow of irregular mi-
gration, and to prevent people smuggling and
trafficking.
In order to reduce the drivers for onward mi-
gration from countries of first arrival above all
the EU should increase asylum standards along
migration routes and recruiting countries of
transit and first arrival for cooperation. It should
not rely on unsafe partner countries with dubi-
ous human rights records. It may be worth in-
vesting resources and political capital in building
up the border-monitoring systems of third coun-
tries, but these policies must be accompanied
by an expansion of protection and opportunities
for refugees (Garlick, 2016). The EU and its
member states are bound to seriously apply
these basic principles of human and refugee
rights in negotiations with third countries.
Cooperation with states with questionable re-
cords on human rights and the rule of law is
problematic in normative terms, but also on the
grounds of diplomatic credibility. A single-mind-
ed focus on migration control in such partner-
ships should give way to a broader, humanitar-
ian, development-oriented and rights-based
approach. A human rights mainstreaming ap-
proach should be developed for each of the
stages of refuge and migration.
A cornerstone of the new cooperation sys-
tem with third countries is the EU-Turkey
Statement (Batalla Adam, 2016; Collet, 2016;
Jacobsen, 2016). It has been criticised due to a
lack of human and refugee rights guarantees in
Turkey itself and also in Greece (Amnesty
International, 2017; Human Rights Watch,
2016; Medecins sans Frontiers, 2016). In spite
of this criticism, the Statement still serves as a
blueprint for further agreements with North
African countries. EU cooperation with third
countries is obviously worthwhile for controlling
large migration flows particularly via the sea
route. Turkey proved itself to be entirely capable
of limiting irregular migration on its coastlines.
However, since the attempted coup in 2015,