CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM AND THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION
107
tween France and Germany, but that is not all.
More players must come on board. In that re-
spect, with the United Kingdom in the process
of leaving, opportunities are opening up for
Member States such as Spain.
The response of the EU and its Member States
to the crisis of multilateralism is capable of mate-
rialising in three ways. First, renationalisation,
division and decline in integration and, therefore,
a dispersion of external action. Second, a rear-
rangement dependant on the other major pow-
ers, acting reactively to the United States, China
and Russia. And third, the most desirable, a
“Eurolateralism” consisting of asserting all the
economic, political and cultural influence of
the EU to structure a world in the 21
st
century
based on rules more favourable to European po-
sitions, interests and values. According to this
option, with the current constellation of leaders
such as Trump, Putin or Xi Jinping, the response
of the EU and its Member States would not be
“Europe First,” but a multilateralism reformed
and led by the Europeans, in the image of the
best of the EU. There appears to be no other
option that will enable the EU to survive in a
hostile environment like the present one.