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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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shift, to the extent that in February 2018, it ex-
pressed its determination to enlarge the Union
to the six Western Balkans countries of Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Kosovo and Albania by 2025. However, voices
have been raised calling for the new Balkans
strategy to carefully modulate the accession
process. It comes at a crucial moment in the re-
construction of the European project and is
problematic in itself in that there are pending
issues such as: economic reforms, persistence of
high levels of corruption, internal disputes be-
tween countries of the area, human rights, or
even the non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU
Member States, including Spain. Against this
background, it seems prudent to stagger the
process of accessions through very strict moni-
toring. The recent Sofia Summit in May 2018 as
well as the European Council in June seem to
point to a third alternative route, both to a rap-
id adhesion and to closing doors to new candi-
dates. In this regard, President Macron has ad-
vocated allowing new accessions to the
culmination of the reform of the Union, as well
as a significant advance in sub-regional integra-
tion among the six countries involved - which
would eventually be backed politically and fi-
nancially by the EU and its Member States.
As for Turkey, the door to accession appears
to have shut owing to the authoritarian moves
of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime in
terms of human rights and freedoms, a drift that
the mass jailing of journalists well symbolises.
This situation will block progress on the EU ac-
cession process, despite the effectiveness of the
deal with Ankara to put a brake on irregular im-
migration. As positions become more inflamed
– with Germany too – and Turkish authoritarian-
ism become more pronounced, there is a grow-
ing perception among the still 28 Member States
that the present model of relations no longer fit
for purpose. Because of that, the EU may be
heading for a shift toward a more pragmatic and
realistic relationship, opening diplomatic and po-
litical channels for resolving specific issues, such
as migration, the conflicts with Cyprus and
Greece, or policy on the Middle East, which
could restore a better political climate in the me-
dium term.
Conclusions. From multilateralism to
“Eurolateralism”?
Paradoxically, one of the consequences of the
isolationism, of the abandonment of multilater-
alism and of the protectionism on the part of
the United States is that it has served to unite
the European partners in defence of their prin-
ciples, at least rhetorically, though major results
have yet to materialise. Trump and Brexit did not
hamper, but even reactivated significant pro-
gress on some issues. The most notable devel-
opments have been in connection with the
United States and to quite a lesser degree, with
Russia and China. There has been significant
progress on trade policy, on defence and secu-
rity, on the environment, on specific regional
dossiers, or on the window of EU enlargement.
In the light of events over the last year, what
can we expect of the Member States and the
Union as a whole in the immediate future? The
current moment is one of fluctuation between
a “leap forward” and stagnation. Following the
elections in France and the forming of a coali-
tion government in Germany, the path appears
to be clear to starting the Franco-German en-
gine of major reform in the EU, which means
Europe’s external action could enter a phase of
change and progress in many fields. The leader-
ship to sustain a multilateral order with a suitable
place for Europe requires synchronisation be-