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CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM AND THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION
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month after another climate conference in
Bonn, with the attendance of over 50 heads of
state and government, including the presence
of representatives of several US states, as well as
businesspeople and philanthropists. French
President Macron acted as world leader, creat-
ing a “counter moment” to the situation cre-
ated by the US Administration. As he did at the
UN General Assembly in September 2017,
Macron reaffirmed at the summit that the EU
would not renegotiate the climate deal under
any circumstances, though he did leave the
door open to the US federal government if it
decided to return to the agreement at any time.
True, the summit did not succeed in securing
binding commitments to cut carbon emissions,
nor were new funds freed up to facilitate the
transition to non-fossil energies in developing
countries ($100 billion had been pledged in
Paris in 2015). Despite that, and under the im-
petus of Europe, important commitments were
made that serve as signal with a view to the fu-
ture. For example, the announcement by multi-
lateral institutions such as the World Bank that it
would not be financing any more gas explora-
tion or extraction projects after 2019; the an-
nouncement by China that it would be launch-
ing its own domestic carbon market; the creation
of a climate research observatory to put pressure
on companies that emit greenhouse gases; or
the start of a carbon price market in the Americas
that includes regions such as California or
Quebec. The road map for the Europeans fea-
tures an EU-level strategy that allows Member
States to make good on the funding pledged in
the framework of their national plans for the re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions; the rein-
forcement of the alliances with cities, states, re-
gions and companies (particularly in the United
States); or the increase in channels of influence
with Beijing to keep China in the deal.
Strategic autonomy: the Middle East
America’s new coolness towards Europe has
acted as a spur to launch the Europe of Defence
and so-called Permanent Structure Cooperation,
symbolised in the meeting of foreign and de-
fence ministers called by High Representative
Mogherini in November 2017. The usual dy-
namic of complementarity and tension within
NATO and between the EU and NATO has been
accentuated by the US demand to raise defence
budgets to 2 % of GDP at the Alliance’s summit
in May 2017. That has given rise to a certain
reconsideration of the EU’s own strategic line.
The implications of possible greater strategic
autonomy have been felt on many fronts and
particularly in relation to the Middle East, a geo-
political crossroads where the interests of multi-
ple players meet, both regional – Israel, Turkey,
Saud Arabia and so on – and external – Russia
and the United States. Trump’s dramatic shift
relative to Obama’s policy in the Middle East –
favouring the governments of traditional allies
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia – posed a chal-
lenge to the EU, which however reacted appro-
priately, persevering with its own strategic line.
On the one hand, it has stood up to Trump’s
continuous threats to withdraw from the nu-
clear deal with Iran of June 2015 – a triumph of
European diplomacy and of the multilateral ap-
proach – and the sanctions imposed on the re-
gime by Washington. Another major break with
the United States has to do with the Israel-
Palestine conflict. The announcement by Trump
in December 2017 that America would be rec-
ognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel – con-
trary to UN resolutions and the consensus with
Europe and the international community on the
issue – and moving its embassy to the holy city
triggered immediate criticism from community
institutions and the various foreign ministries