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CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM AND THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION
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the main bodies of regional integration and
multilateral forums in Latin America and the
Americas, from the UNASUR to the CELAC, tak-
ing in the OAS. Mexico in particular has gone
through a tricky time, both because of the con-
troversy of the Peña Nieto presidency with
Trump on migration issues – DACA or the wall
– and the difficulties in renegotiating the NAFTA
with the United States and Canada. Similarly,
the delicate situation in major countries with
various elections in 2017 and 2018, such as
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, un-
doubtedly influenced a trend towards introspec-
tion and a neglect of multilateralism.
Paradoxically, the decline went hand-in-hand
with a certain awareness of the opportunity to
revive integration in a context of US withdrawal,
although it has not materialised yet – perhaps
with the exception of the Pacific Alliance. On
the other hand, with regard to the EU, there has
indeed been a significant revival in the area of
the trade treaties mentioned above: EU-Mexico,
EU-Mercosur and EU-Chile. The EU, with Spain
at the head, has continued to send signals to
the region that Latin America matters, irrespec-
tive of the change of election cycle.
A prime example of this relative weakening
of the regional and multilateral architecture was
the postponement of the 3
rd
CELAC-EU Summit
scheduled for October 2017 in San Salvador
and put back to 2018, mainly owing to the
Venezuelan crisis. A common feature running
through the recent period is the divisive factor
of the “Chavism” of President Nicolas Maduro
and the Venezuelan crisis, aggravated by the
dissolution of the Parliament, the creation of a
Constituent Assembly and the calling of elec-
tions for May 2018. The polarisation has been
felt in regional meetings and forums, pitting
Caracas against the Mercosur, the UNASUR and
the OAS, for example; in the electoral processes
in neighbouring countries such as Cuba or
Venezuela; and in relations with the EU too. As
a new “common position” of the EU Member
States, Brussels has imposed sanctions on senior
officials of the Maduro regime since early 2018,
on top of those applied in November 2017.
Europe is faced with a difficult prospect follow-
ing the failure of the negotiating team headed
by former Spanish Prime Minister Rodríguez
Zapatero. In the short term, there appears to be
no other way but to keep up the pressure
through selective sanctions and encourage dia-
logue despite the setbacks. Yet the most impor-
tant thing, with Spain at the head, is to actively
accumulate a critical and regional diplomatic
mass (CELAC, UNASUR) to avert the scenario of
an outright civil war and humanitarian crisis. On
Cuba, meanwhile, European action remains firm
in the terms of the Dialogue and Cooperation
Agreement, while in April 2018 the replacement
of Raúl Castro took place. With the full support
of European diplomacy and the High
Representative, Brussels is moving towards posi-
tive incentives to make progress on economic
efficiency and a certain political liberalisation.
Dilemmas of enlargement: the Balkans and
Turkey
Lastly, against a backdrop of Brexit, Euroscepticism
and a general withdrawal into nationalism, we
must highlight how important the issue of en-
largement to the neighbourhood has become
again. The matter has been reopened on two
fronts: the Western Balkans and Turkey.
On the one hand, we have the Western
Balkans. The Juncker Commission, which began
its term of office ruling out any possibility of new
enlargements owing to the crisis and certain
“fatigue,” has subsequently made a dramatic