The State of the European Union. The European states facing the reforms of the Union

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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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speed Europe will be one of the discussions
ahead of the Rome anniversary. I understand
the reasons for this. Some expect systemic
changes that would loosen intra-EU ties and
strengthen the role of nations in relation to the
community. Others, quite the opposite, want
new and deeper dimensions of integration,
even if they would apply only to some Member
States. Such a possibility is indeed foreseen in
the treaties currently in force. However, consid-
ering the interests of the community of 27
countries in the context of the upcoming Brexit
negotiations, as well as the long-term strategic
interests of the EU, I will be urging everyone to
strive towards maintaining political unity among
the 27. This is why, when discussing the various
scenarios for Europe, our main objective should
be to strengthen mutual trust and unity among
the 27. After today’s debate, I can openly say
that all 27 leaders agree with this objective. This
was an optimistic discussion about our common
future, with a positive approach from all sides,
without any exception”.18
Currently, then, there are two large groups
of states with two different general visions of
the future of Europe: the nationalist group
(those who “expect systemic changes that
would loosen intra-EU ties and strengthen the
role of nations in relation to the community”)
and the Europeanist group (those who “quite
the opposite, want new and deeper dimensions
of integration, even if they would apply only to
some Member States”).19
18Available at:
The italics are ours.
19We propose this classification knowing that political
classifications are generally reductionist, but they simplify
understanding of more or less complex historical processes,
as is the case of European integration.
There are three important points to highlight
from the text. First, the now longstanding idea
of a multi-speed Europe20 has dominated the
current debate within the European Council
from the start; second, as we can read in Presi-
dent Tusk’s text, the two groups of states have
conflicting expressions: “… others, quite the
opposite, want new and deeper dimensions of
integration…” 21, and third, at least in Tusk’s of-
ficial presentation, over and above those differ-
ences they all had a positive approach, which
allows us to look ahead to the outcome of the
debate with certain optimism, despite the fact
that it has been inadequate and, as usual in Eu-
ropean Council debates, it was still affected by
a large lack of transparency that prevents us
from knowing which Heads of State or Govern-
ment are in the first group outlined by Tusk and
which are in the second.
If this informal debate at the European
Council of March 2017 about the issues raised
by the European Commission’s White paper
were the first and only one to take place, we
should be sorry because the essential issue im-
plicitly raised by the White paper is nothing
short of European political union. The issue re-
20 A clear indication of the origins of this idea is to be found
in the theory of the differentiated integration of Europe put
into practice since the outset of European construction,
though its implementation has been much more important
since the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. See on
the subject: Ponzano, Paulo: “L’intégration différenciée au
sein de liUnion Européenne et la constitutionnalisation de la
zone euro”. Revue GRASPE, no. 26, pages 38-48. Available
at: . As far as
European dignitaries are concerned, Jacques Delors above
all defended the value of this theory since the start of this
century. For more details, see: and,
particularly: Bertoncini, Yves: L’intégration différenciée dans
l’Union Européenne: une légitimité à géométrie variable,
available at:
21 See above, footnote 18. The italics are ours.