THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
24
Donald Tusk’s summary, we can distinguish
two groups of states.
First, a group of 20 states that would be in-
clined to choose a model of integration like Sce-
nario 3, that is: “Those who want more do
more”
29
, in the belief that this scenario sums up
better than any other the idea of a multi-speed
Europe. In this group, we could include France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, Austria, Lithuania, Estonia,
Sweden, Finland, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Bul-
garia, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia. It includes
the four countries that carry most political
weight in the Union – namely Germany, France,
Italy and Spain – by number of votes in the
Council and because in total they make up over
50 % of the Union’s population.
In France, the
Initiative for Europe
taken by
President Emmanuel Macron in September
2017
30
is currently the state initiative in favour
of the creation of a “hard core” of states that
champion a multi-speed Europe at least: “Eu-
rope is already moving at various speeds. So let’s
not be afraid to say so and to want it!” “As we
constantly accommodate the driving ambition
of some and respect the speed of each one, we
can cultivate the desire to push ahead and Eu-
rope will progress to everyone’s benefit.”
31
So, if France has once again led the defence
of the European integration process, following
29
See:
White paper on the future of Europe ,op. cit
., page 20.
30
See: speech of 26 September 2017 at the Sorbonne:
Initiative pour l’Europe. Une Europe souveraine, unie,
démocratique.
Available at:
http://www.elysee.fr/declara tions/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel- macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/31
Ibid.
, pages 14 and 9, respectively. Our translation.
Note the similarity of Macron’s speech to the summary
that President Tusk made of the first, informal and, so far,
only substantial debate by the European Council on the
functioning of the European Union in relation to the future
of Europe.
the difficult but promising government agree-
ment between the Christian Democrat party
and the Social Democrats, finally approved on
4 March 2018, Germany is now in a position to
actively join the French initiative by defending
Scenario 3, at least. Berlin could also review
the dominant economic ideology of austerity
in its European policy and, in parallel, the pre-
vailing one within the European Council for a
decade.
In this group of states, as we said before, the
case of Italy is a special one following the vic-
tory in the legislative elections of 4 March 2018
of parties and movements that maintain a
Europhobic line.
Second, the group of seven states that
would rather opt for a model of functioning of
the Union matching Scenario 4, that is to say:
“Doing less more efficiently”
32
. In this group,
we could place the Visegrad Group (Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Latvia.
Within that group of states, the important
Visegrad Group (with 25 years of history be-
hind it), which is not exactly Europeanist right
now given the attitudes and political action of
its members in sensitive spheres for Europe
such as the rule of law or immigration, repre-
sents a significant remnant of Euroscepticism,
particularly in its two main members: Poland
and Hungary.
However, while separately the Heads of
State or Government of the States that make it
up may have their own individual views (for in-
stance, during the recent presidential election
campaign in the Czech Republic the re-elected
Miloš Zeman explicitly declared himself a feder-
32
See: European Commission,
White paper on the future of Europe,
op. cit
., page 22.