The State of the European Union. The European states facing the reforms of the Union

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THE STATES ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
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quires constant deliberation (and not only after
Brexit) and clear answers, even if they are not
unanimous in each of the (progressive or regres-
sive) phases of the integration process22.
So, let us suppose that as well as that infor-
mal mini-debate, the European Council mem-
bers were called upon to choose one of the five
scenarios described by the Commission in its
White paper on the future of Europe.
Unless Scenario 1 prevailed, that is to say:
“Carrying on”23 , at the moment of truth the
five scenarios in the White paper on the Future
of Europe would probably come down to two:
Scenario 3 (“Those who want more do more”)
and Scenario 4 (“Doing less more efficiently”).
No member of the European Council to date
has championed Scenario 2, that is to say,
“Nothing but the single market”24 as the sole
option, not even the Head of Government of
the most Eurosceptic state out of the veterans,
the United Kingdom25.
Scenario 5, that is to say, “Doing much more
together” (and the maximalist -in a good way-
idealism inspiring it), appears to have been
dropped by all the leaders now, even by the
22With the first discussion on the Multiannual Financial
Framework 2021-2027, at the informal European Council
meeting of 23 February 2018, it became clear that some
members of the European Council appeared to have
indicated the need to conclude the discussion on the
scenarios of the future of Europe before deciding on the
Union’s budget.
23See: , page 16.
24 Ibid., page. 18.
25See David Cameron’s letter to Donald Tusk of 10
November 2015. Available at:
most Europeanist26. Indeed, to date no Head of
State or Government nor any party leader has
clearly championed it.
We must remember, as the Commission
does in the White paper, that the scenarios
overlap and, therefore, they are neither mutu-
ally exclusive nor comprehensive.
In any case, save a major electoral upheaval
(highly unlikely now that we overcame the
threats from Europhobic parties and movements
that stood in the elections of the two main
states of the Union, Germany and France, as
well as in the Netherlands and Austria, in 2017),
– If we follow what we could call the ideo-
logical criterion of the stance on Europe
(more Europeanist or more nationalist) of
the current members of the European
Council.
– Bearing mind the results of legislative or
presidential27 elections and the respective
changes of government.
– Bearing in mind the previously mentioned de-
bate at the EuropeanCouncil of 10March 2017.
– And, lastly, the statements or initiatives of
Heads of State or Government after that
date, by means of a classification that is nec-
essarily reductionist28 yet consistent with
26Jean-Claude Juncker’s phrase: “Il faut cesser de parler
des États Unis d’Europe” (lecture at the Jacques Delors
Institute, Paris, April 2016) is a symbol of the current retreat
of the European federalist discourse. However, in his State
of the Union address of September 2017, Juncker offered
what he calls a “sixth scenario” whose description has
proactive features comparable with those of Scenario 5 of
the Commission’s White Paper.
27In 2018, there are presidential elections in Ireland,
Finland, Czech Republic and Cyprus and legislative elections
in Italy, Sweden, Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia.
28However, this reduction of the diversity (or wealth) of
positions in the European Council is consistent with the only
“official” classification of the stances adopted by the states
on the future of Europe, namely the one that Donald Tusk
described in March 2017. See above, page 4.