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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

28

However, we also have to maintain a healthy

scepticism, based on experience, about the real

benefit for the Union of citizens’ votes of a

merely intrastate scope that are entirely non-

binding on the state itself or on the Union.

The states and certain important

institutional issues

It is worth noting that three important insti-

tutional issues have entered the debate on the

future of Europe since 2017 and two of them

were already addressed at the first European

Council meeting of 2018.

We are talking about transnational lists for the

European elections, the issue of so-called “lead

candidates” (

Spitzenkandidaten

) and merging

the posts of President of the European Council

and President of the European Commission.

43

Note that the first two issues are urgent in

that in theory they could affect the organisation

of the elections to the European Parliament of

2019 and the election of the next European

Commission President, respectively. However,

given the division that the two issues have caused

within the European Parliament and Council

themselves, they are not expected to be resolved

in the current parliamentary term at least.

However, the issue of merging the presiden-

cies does not appear urgent in itself and, what’s

more, given its major importance, it is surprising

how it was raised and by who, namely the Pres-

ident of the Commission in a

State of the Union

43

 For a more detailed examination of these questions, see:

Kreilinger, Valentin:

A More Democratic European Union.

Propositions and Scope for Political Action

, Policy Paper no.

212, 5 January 2018, Jacques Delors Institute (Berlin), pages.

10 to 17. Available at:

http://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2018/01/amoredemocraticeuropeanunion- kreilinger-jdib-jan18.pdf

address

and in the following terms: “More de-

mocracy means more efficiency. Europe would

function better if we were to merge the Presi-

dents of the European Council and the Euro-

pean Commission. … Europe would be easier to

understand if one captain was steering the ship.

Having a single President would simply better

reflect the true nature of our European Union as

both a union of states and a union of citizens”.

44

It is also striking that the idea should be justified

by a reference to the efficiency of the Union,

with no further arguments. And the absence of

a reference to the legitimacy of the Union is

even more surprising, as the merger would

mean scrapping 60 years’ validity of the Union’s

principle of institutional balance overnight

45

,

largely invalidating the healthy principle of the

separation of powers and, particularly, jeopard-

ising the independence of the Commission, en-

shrined in the treaties as the institution that

guarantees the Union’s general interest.

In any event, the idea is not new. It was al-

ready discussed during the Convention on the

Future of Europe in 2003, with the creation of

the figure of a permanent President of the Euro-

pean Council, and was ultimately rejected and

excluded from the Constitution for Europe pro-

ject. The arguments against it at the time re-

main valid against the arguments in favour of

such a merger (such as those employed by

Juncker) and refer above all, as far as the effi-

ciency of the Union is concerned, to the nega-

tive consequences that the assumption of ex-

ecutive and legislative responsibilities by one

single person would entail and with, regard to

44

 Juncker, J. C.:

State of the Union Address,

13 September

2017,

op. cit

.

45

 The principle of institutional balance was created by the

European Court of Justice in 1958, in the Meroni ruling.

Said principle forbids any interference by a Union institution

in the powers conferred on another.