THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
28
However, we also have to maintain a healthy
scepticism, based on experience, about the real
benefit for the Union of citizens’ votes of a
merely intrastate scope that are entirely non-
binding on the state itself or on the Union.
The states and certain important
institutional issues
It is worth noting that three important insti-
tutional issues have entered the debate on the
future of Europe since 2017 and two of them
were already addressed at the first European
Council meeting of 2018.
We are talking about transnational lists for the
European elections, the issue of so-called “lead
candidates” (
Spitzenkandidaten
) and merging
the posts of President of the European Council
and President of the European Commission.
43
Note that the first two issues are urgent in
that in theory they could affect the organisation
of the elections to the European Parliament of
2019 and the election of the next European
Commission President, respectively. However,
given the division that the two issues have caused
within the European Parliament and Council
themselves, they are not expected to be resolved
in the current parliamentary term at least.
However, the issue of merging the presiden-
cies does not appear urgent in itself and, what’s
more, given its major importance, it is surprising
how it was raised and by who, namely the Pres-
ident of the Commission in a
State of the Union
43
For a more detailed examination of these questions, see:
Kreilinger, Valentin:
A More Democratic European Union.
Propositions and Scope for Political Action
, Policy Paper no.
212, 5 January 2018, Jacques Delors Institute (Berlin), pages.
10 to 17. Available at:
http://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2018/01/amoredemocraticeuropeanunion- kreilinger-jdib-jan18.pdfaddress
and in the following terms: “More de-
mocracy means more efficiency. Europe would
function better if we were to merge the Presi-
dents of the European Council and the Euro-
pean Commission. … Europe would be easier to
understand if one captain was steering the ship.
Having a single President would simply better
reflect the true nature of our European Union as
both a union of states and a union of citizens”.
44
It is also striking that the idea should be justified
by a reference to the efficiency of the Union,
with no further arguments. And the absence of
a reference to the legitimacy of the Union is
even more surprising, as the merger would
mean scrapping 60 years’ validity of the Union’s
principle of institutional balance overnight
45
,
largely invalidating the healthy principle of the
separation of powers and, particularly, jeopard-
ising the independence of the Commission, en-
shrined in the treaties as the institution that
guarantees the Union’s general interest.
In any event, the idea is not new. It was al-
ready discussed during the Convention on the
Future of Europe in 2003, with the creation of
the figure of a permanent President of the Euro-
pean Council, and was ultimately rejected and
excluded from the Constitution for Europe pro-
ject. The arguments against it at the time re-
main valid against the arguments in favour of
such a merger (such as those employed by
Juncker) and refer above all, as far as the effi-
ciency of the Union is concerned, to the nega-
tive consequences that the assumption of ex-
ecutive and legislative responsibilities by one
single person would entail and with, regard to
44
Juncker, J. C.:
State of the Union Address,
13 September
2017,
op. cit
.
45
The principle of institutional balance was created by the
European Court of Justice in 1958, in the Meroni ruling.
Said principle forbids any interference by a Union institution
in the powers conferred on another.