THE STATES ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
29
legitimacy, to the difficulty in devising an effec-
tive mechanism of parliamentary censure.
46
Anyway, this is an institutional matter of the
first order and the European Council should not
address it until after an appropriate debate in
the Parliament, not forgetting that such an in-
stitutional modification would probably require
a reform of the treaties.
The other two issues mentioned, namely,
possible transnational lists and the way in which
the EU appoints senior officials, including the
“lead candidates” (
Spitzenkandidaten
), were
included on the agenda of the informal
European Council meeting of 23 February 2018,
but addressing the former has been postponed
sine die
.
As for the “lead candidates,” the European
Council has been unenthusiastic about the pro-
posal of the European Parliament (backed by
the President of the Commission) of repeating
in 2019 the procedure applied following the
European elections of 2014 (election as
President of the Commission of the candidate
to receive most votes in the Parliament). Indeed,
the European Council has said that it cannot
guarantee in advance that it will propose one of
the lead candidates for President of the
Commission and recalled that the Treaty is very
clear on the autonomous power of the European
Council to designate the candidate, taking into
consideration the European elections and hav-
ing maintained the appropriate consultations.
Finally, regarding Juncker’s proposal of merg-
ing the two presidencies, the European Council
46
For an examination of the possible reasons for this
surprising proposal from Juncker and on the negative
effects of the merger of the two presidencies, see:
Dauvergne, Alain,
Un chapeau pour deux têtes: une
simplification compliquée
. Available at:
http://institutdelors. eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/unchapeaupourdeuxttes- dauvergne-tribune-sept17.pdfrefused to deal with the matter. Donald Tusk
himself made it clear: “Jean-Claude also pre-
sented the idea of a merger of our two posts,
but there was no appetite to take this forward.
Above all, because it would substantially reduce
the role of Member States in the EU”.
47
Conclusion
In 2017, while the economic, social and migra-
tion crisis, the crisis of political representation,
nationalisms and Brexit may have partly legiti-
mised the pragmatic attitude of the states,
which turned their attention to specific issues of
a more or less urgent nature, both the states
individually and the European Council devoted
a debate of limited value to the underlying
problem – the Union’s model of political func-
tioning – and squandered the deliberative po-
tential of the Commission’s
White paper
on the
Future of Europe.
The model of a
multi-speed Europe
received
greatest support from the states, over the rest
of the models put to debate.
While that model is not ideal for the more
Europeanists and it means a slowdown in the
process of European integration, it could render
arguments aimed at halting the advance to-
wards union or at triggering exit from the
Union, following the British example, with little
justification.
The “future of Europe” that will be shaped
by the decisions that the states have to take as
of 2018 on each of the sectorial issues or poli-
cies considered priority by the States is in all
47
Available at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ press-releases/2018/02/23/remarks-by-president-donald- tusk-following-the-informal-meeting-of-the-27-heads-of- state-or-government-on-23-february-2018/