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Ten years have passed since the American
investment bank Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt, triggering the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis in 2008. This was not the only great
crisis for Europe. The European Union (EU)
stumbled into the euro crisis in 2009, 2015 saw
the start of what has come to be known as the
refugee crisis, and since 2016 there has been
ongoing crisis management to handle Brexit.
The last ten years of crisis have made it very
clear that the architecture of European integra-
tion is incomplete: the EU was unable to come
up with an immediate and sustainable answer
to any of these challenges. The Lisbon Treaty
toolbox was only properly equipped for design-
ing the Brexit process. In the political areas of
economic and monetary union and migration,
however, ad hoc management began. In the
choir of the European institutions and Member-
State governments, some were louder and more
efficient than others, and this crisis manage-
ment was strongly shaped by the German gov-
ernment. While the European Commission has
undisputed leadership in Brexit negations with
Great Britain at EU-level, Berlin has played a sig-
nificant role in steering political reactions on the
euro crisis and the refugee crisis. This was not
always a success in terms of content. Germany
was too insensitive to the demands of other
states, and tried to impose the course it deemed
best for itself as a model for its neighbours.
However, in terms of power politics it is worth
pointing out that Germany’s hegemonic role in
Europe worked amazingly well in the euro crisis,
while external factors and domestic politics put
a brake on it during the refugee crisis.
As a phase of comprehensive EU reform be-
gins, with an eye to the 2019 European elec-
tions, where does Germany position itself to
provide a lasting solution to the deficits in the
EU response to crises? This text will indicate
new and old lines of conflict that split Germany
and the continent.
More or less integration?
Respect and approval for the EU have suffered
greatly from the duration and number of crises
in Europe, and more so from the policies put in
place to deal with them. These policies were
initially inadequate and in many ways misguid-
ed, but they were later billed as the only alterna-
tive. Across the continent, the axis of conflict
Lines of conflict on EU
reform in Germany
Björn Hacker