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LINES OF CONFLICT ON EU REFORM IN GERMANY
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to the EU, a softening of ordoliberal principles
of stability, and the transfer of German tax mon-
ey to other states in the Eurozone. Since then
the party has held all manner of positions in op-
position to the current level of integration, in-
cluding: exclusion of individual countries from
the monetary union; Germany’s exit from this
union; a division of the currency area into a
northern and southern Eurozone; parallel cur-
rencies; and winding up the single currency.
Thus the AfD rejects any progressive reform of
the Eurozone architecture. On migration, the
AfD is the only party to propose the extreme
measure of unilaterally closing borders to pre-
vent immigration. It argues that only highly
qualified migration to Germany should be al-
lowed, and only on the basis of economic need.
The right to asylum should be highly restricted,
and cooperation with other states on this issue
should focus solely on protecting the external
borders of the EU.
Although the distinction between these two
camps is clear, one should not overlook the fact
that even within the pro-European parties, there
are currents of dissatisfaction with the way that
the euro crisis and the refugee crisis have devel-
oped. Growing unease with the EU among
large parts of the population, reflected in the
electoral success of right-wing populists, has
pushed political discourse in Germany as a
whole to the right over recent years. It has
moved increasingly from a focus on the benefits
of the Union, towards questions of maximising
national benefits and self-determination. This
was already evident at the start of the euro cri-
sis, as there were individual critics in the CDU
(Wolfgang Bosbach), the CSU (Peter Gauweiler),
and the FDP (Frank Schäffler); these MPs gained
media attention for their opposition to the
Chancellor and their positions that went against
the majority view in their parliamentary groups.
As the crisis went on, critical positions gained
more widespread support. Thus there was back-
ing for a Greek exit from the currency union, at
least on a temporary basis, from several con-
servative politicians such as the current Minister
President of Bavaria, Markus Söder, and the for-
mer federal Finance Minister, Wolfgang
Schäuble. The extent to which the Bavarian CSU
took on AfD positions is particularly striking.
This was even more evident on migration and
integration than reform of the currency union.
In order to “close the right flank”, CSU head
and federal Interior Minister, Horst Seehofer,
surprised the Chancellor among others by mak-
ing regular calls for caps on asylum-seeker num-
bers, stricter implementation of deportation,
and an ongoing exclusion of family reunion. He
also alleged that Islam does not belong in
Germany.
The popularity of the right has also left its
mark on other parties. Christian Lindner, head
of the Free Liberals (FDP), has experienced this
since the federal election: his party, which was
once the most pro-European party in Germany
(just think of the former Foreign Ministers Hans-
Dietrich Genscher and Klaus Kinkel), has been
influenced by a trend towards national liberal-
ism. An increased focus on competition has led
to greater calls for rejecting solidarity with
neighbouring states to help them overcome the
crisis, and for limits on refugees’ right to remain.
The left-wing
Die Linke
party is concerned about
excessive demands on the poor and those on
low incomes due to increasing migration and
integration requirements. Its fundamentalist
wing, under parliamentary group chair Sahra
Wagenknecht would like to limit immigration to
Germany. Furthermore, Wagenknecht has al-
ready repeatedly called for the Eurozone to be
abolished.