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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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between supporters and opponents of European
integration has become more significant. In the
course of the integration process there have
never been quiet periods, and there have always
been interest groups that have opposed
European policy – you only have to look at the
controversial introduction of the single currency,
the discussions about the Constitutional Treaty
or the protests against the Bolkestein directive
on the free movement of services. Nevertheless,
all these transnational controversies focused on
finding a consensus path for reform. Over the
last decade, however, there has been a notice-
able tendency for dissatisfaction with particular
political weak points at a European level to lead
to a general rejection of further integration. For
a long time the number of people favouring a
rollback of integration was insignificantly small.
The electoral success of populist parties in most
Member States has meant that rejection of the
EU or parts of its integration structure has be-
come more widespread.
While politicians in many Member States
have long had to deal with populist right-wing
parties and their defensive position against
Europe on a daily basis, Germany remained an
exception for a long time. Apart from briefly
holding seats in regional and state parliaments,
far-right parties had not managed to enter main-
stream political arenas before 2014. The political
discourse in Europe was correspondingly pro-
European. It was only since 2014 that
Alternative
für Deutschland
(AfD; Alternative for Germany),
which was founded the previous year, finally
managed to establish itself in all state parlia-
ments except for Hessen and Bavaria (which
have elections coming up in autumn 2018) and
the European Parliament. It also entered the
German federal parliament in 2017 with 12.6 %
of the votes. The AfD often criticises the pro-
European line of other parties, particularly the
parties of government. It was founded in 2013
in large part because of the growing protest
against Chancellor Angela Merkel’s dominant
management of the euro crisis. Dissatisfaction
with the Chancellor’s line on migration policy
further boosted the party.
Since then, there have been two political
camps in Germany separated by the line of con-
flict: “more or less Europe”. The side supporting
Europe includes the governing parties – the
conservative CDU and CSU and the social dem-
ocratic SPD, and some parties of opposition –
the Free Liberals (FDP), the Greens and the so-
cialist
Die Linke
party. They are all open to the
principle of deepening EU integration. They be-
lieve Germany has a particular responsibility for
the progress of the integration process, and
they frequently argue that European coopera-
tion is necessary on the basis of historical evi-
dence. In this camp there is an assumption that
extensive EU reform is needed, so people are
open to debate on the issue. However not all
the political actors in these parties share the
creed so beloved of the media: that we must
necessarily welcome French President Emmanuel
Macron’s bid to “refound Europe”. As well, the
proposed reform steps published by the
European Commission in the White Paper on EU
reform since 2017 are heavily criticised by some.
This pro-European camp is opposed by the
Eurosceptic AfD, which strongly advocates abo-
lition of the single currency, and closed borders.
The party was founded during the euro crisis as
a conglomeration of liberal and conservative
critics of the euro rescue fund bailout loans for
EU Member States hit by the crisis, but increas-
ingly nationalist voices gained the upper hand.
The AfD stands out from all other parties in the
German federal parliament for its increasingly
radical positions. When it was founded, the party
warned against a further transfer of sovereignty