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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
62
period required less time than initially anticipat-
ed
24
. The UK negotiating team’s concession,
practically without conditions, to EU demands
revealed its urgent need to deliver a transition
agreement as soon as possible so as to prevent
businesses from making contingency plans in-
volving the transfer of operations out of the UK.
The Commission’s 19 March announcement
that an agreement had been reached on transi-
tion and other important aspects of the with-
drawal agreement signified a great step forward
that generated a wave of optimism
25
. Solid
agreement has now been reached on issues
such as citizens’ rights, UK financial liabilities
related to withdrawal, the greater part of provi-
sions related to the process of separation, the
circulation of goods in the Single Market, cus-
toms procedures, budgetary considerations, in-
tellectual property, data protection and the UK’s
withdrawal from Euratom. Minor pending tech-
nical issues apart, agreement has yet to be
reached on two highly central political issues:
the governance of the agreement (institutional
24
The Commission’s articulation of conditions for the
transition period dismayed certain members of the British
government worried that the UK would become a “vassal
state” forced to apply the complete spectrum of EU regula-
tion without exception or right to participate in EU policy-
making. In order to close the agreement, EU negotiators
offered their counterparts the possibility of consultation on
issues of particular importance to the UK during the period
in question.
25
The document released by the Commission 19 March
was a “coloured” version of the agreement in which text
agreed at the negotiator’s level were highlighted in green,
texts agreed in terms of policy objectives that required ed-
iting or clarifications were highlighted in yellow and texts
proposed by the Union but still under discussion were
left unhighlighted. (Task Force Art. 50):
Draft Withdrawal
Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community high-
lighting the progress made (coloured version) in the nego-
tiation round with the UK of 16-19 March 2018
, Brussels,
19 March 2018, (TF50 (2018) 35).
procedures for interpreting and applying the fi-
nal agreement and resolving related disputes)
and the open question as to how the border
between the two Irelands is to be handled.
The issue of governance has been partially
resolved thanks to the British acceptance of the
EU proposal to create a joint committee charged
with ensuring the good functioning of the
agreement, dealing with unforeseen situations
that may arise, deciding whether it is necessary
to incorporate future amendments as provided
for in the withdrawal agreement and resolve
potential conflicts between the signatory par-
ties. One stumbling block to further progress yet
to be overcome is British negotiators’ insistence
that the UK will leave the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice upon its withdrawal
from the EU, a possibility that the EU will not,
and cannot, accept. The Irish border question
having been somewhat fudged in December,
the “regulatory alignment” the UK agreed to in
order to avoid a hard border must now be clear-
ly defined. This is a politically delicate and le-
gally irresolvable issue given that the only theo-
retically admissible way to avoid the imposition
of a hard border between the two Irelands go-
ing forward is for the UK to remain a part of the
EU Customs Union, an option that the UK gov-
ernment has dismissed out of hand. The UK ar-
gues that it is impossible to tackle this matter
without linking it to the framework for future
economic relations.
Future relations: what does the UK want
and what can the EU offer?
As noted previously, the goal of phase II negotia-
tions is to make the progress on future relations
needed to prepare a political declaration by
March 2019. The EU has taken a firm position