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SPRING 2018 BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS: PROGRESS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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European Council. Should the UK desire to
withdraw its notification and reverse the
process, the Council would impose strict
conditions ensuring that this decision would
not be used to gain political advantages det-
rimental of the interests of the
EU.
3. Negotiation of the terms of withdrawal would
be separated from negotiations concerning
the framework for the future relationship be-
tween the EU and the UK. These negotiation
processes would lead to two different agree-
ments: one related to withdrawal and the
other to the relationship between the two
parties following separation. As a mixed trea-
ty, the latter would need to be ratified at the
national level by all Member States. The over-
riding priorities were to ensure legal certainty
and work towards a separation agreement
that provided the best possible outcomes for
both parties, an approach intended to take
the wind out of the sails of the British govern-
ment’s initial stance that walking away from
the negotiating table without an agreement
on its future relationship with the EU was
preferable to striking an agreement that fell
short of the British public’s expectations
10
.
4. The agreement was to be a package deal in
line with the EU’s established custom of
working towards comprehensive constitu-
tional and policy agreements based on the
principle that “nothing is settled until every-
thing is settled”. Agreements on individual
elements were to be considered provisional
and contingent upon final consensus on the
agreement as a whole.
10
During the early stages of negotiation, Prime Minister
May publicly stated on various occasions that “
no-deal is
better than a bad deal”.
May, T. (UK Prime Minister),
Speech
on the Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the
EU,
Lancaster House, London, 17 January 2017.
The rest of the principles laid out in the
Commission’s general guidelines concerned a
common bargaining position on the substance of
negotiations. These points were articulated to es-
tablish a series of red lines meant to avoid conces-
sions that could possibly undermine the European
model of integration. This strategy called for:
1. Striking a balance between rights and obli-
gations and ensuring a level playing field for
negotiation on concessions anchored in the
principle of reciprocity.
2. Preserving the integrity of the four freedoms
of the EU single market. This issue was im-
portant given the UK government’s ambition
to fulfil its post-referendum pledge to the
British public to restrict the free movement
of EU citizens in and out of UK territory while
maintaining its right to enjoy the free move-
ment of the other three elements covered by
the single market concept: goods, services
and capital. The European objective was to
protect the integrity of its internal market by
binding economic benefits to the acceptance
and fulfilment of all aspects of the single
market framework, including the free move-
ment of persons the UK wished to avoid.
3. Getting the message across that non-mem-
bers cannot have the same rights as mem-
bers and enjoy the same benefits members
enjoy. Given pretensions within the Brexit
camp that it would be possible for the UK to
have its cake and eat it, it was once again
important to make it clear that the UK’s
withdrawal from the Union would entail the
loss of advantages that membership sup-
posed. Any concession on this point would
mean the end of European integration as
many other Member States would inevitably
be tempted to follow the UK’s lead and third
countries would also demand to renegotiate
their standing agreements with the EU.