SPRING 2018 BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS: PROGRESS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
59
Her presentation offered few novelties apart
from the abandonment of her former no-deal
stance and a request for a “period of implemen-
tation” following the UK’s departure from the
EU that would allow the business community
and other stakeholders to adapt to the new
situation. The European Council was neverthe-
less unable to certify sufficient progress on all
points in its October assessment, in which it an-
nounced that it would postpone its decision re-
garding the opening of phase II negotiations
until its December session but conveyed positive
signals to the UK and called for more progress
on points that needed to be resolved in order to
begin discussions concerning the future rela-
tionship between the UK and the EU as soon as
possible
14
.
The assessment was followed by a flurry of
intense diplomatic activity between London and
Brussels focused on reaching consensus on
three critical issues that needed to be resolved
in order to move on to phase II: citizens’ rights,
the Brexit bill and the Northern Irish border. An
eleventh-hour agreement between the two par-
ties reached in December was recorded in a
Joint Report
15
. The final challenge was coming
up with an alternative to the term “regulatory
alignment” that would make the wording of
the compromise on the Irish border acceptable
to DUP MPs, whose continued support in the
House of Commons was crucial to May.
When it met in December, the European
Council accepted the Commission’s proposal to
declare that sufficient progress had been made
14
European Council (Art. 50),
Conclusions.
Brussels, 20
October 2017, (EUCO XT 20014/17), pts. 2 and 3.
15
Negotiators of the European Union and the United King-
dom Government:
Joint Report on progress during phase
1 of negotiations under article 50 TEU on the United King-
dom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union,
Brus-
sels, 8 December 2017, (TF50 (2017) 19).
to move on to phase II
16
. European leaders could
easily be viewed as having been exceedingly be-
nevolent in declaring themselves satisfied with a
number of consensuses so fragile that they
would inevitably need to be reworked further
down the line
17
. Their support for May could
well have been motivated by a desire to avoid a
government crisis in the UK that would further
heighten the atmosphere of crisis looming over
Europe as a whole. The Council also agreed to
May’s request for a transition period and gave
the Commission the mandate to negotiate this
point during phase II, during the course of
which political agreements would be translated
into legal commitments and discussions re-
quired to reach agreement of certain other is-
sues of separation would take place. It never-
theless underscored that further negotiations
would be contingent upon commitments being
fully respected
18
and announced it would adopt
guidelines for negotiations on the framework of
future relationship in March 2018.
The results of phase I were clearly asymmet-
rical with the European Union maintaining the
upper hand throughout the entire process. UK
negotiators were forced to abandon their initial
stances and accept EU positions on one point
after another, from the order in which issues
would be addressed to the substance of the
principal points of withdrawal and to assimilate
16
European Council (Art. 50):
Guidelines,
15 December
2017, (EUCO XT 20011/17).
17
Duff, A.: “Associate or dissociate: it’s make your mind up
time”,
Policy Network,
29 December 2017.
18
The addition of this point was a consequence of a series
of unfortunate remarks made by UK Brexit Secretary David
Davis days earlier that framed the December agreement as
nothing more than “a statement of intent”. Eder, F.: “EU
toughens Brexit resolution after David Davis interview”,
Po-
litico,
12 December 2017,
https://www.politico.eu/article/ eu-toughens-brexit-resolution-after-david-davis-interview/(retrieved 2 April 2018).