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Hayder al-Khoei
Maliki’s broken promises
Maliki took a massive gamble and risked his own life during themilitary campaign but his
strategy paid dividends. By re-establishing security, he became Iraq’s most popular politician
and managed to win a plurality of votes in both the provincial and national elections in 2009
and 2010, respectively. Because the Sunni tribes in Iraq also turned against Al-Qaeda before
the surge of US troops, things were beginning to look good for Iraq.
However, after the civil war began to break out in Syria and the Americans pulled out
of Iraq in 2011, it all went downhill. Maliki reneged on promises made to Sunni tribes
and treated much of the Sunni community with suspicion. His heavy-handed security
measures pushed many into the open arms of ISIS, which in turn mobilized the Shia
militias to respond to this threat.
To add to this toxic mix, Maliki, in order to consolidate his grip on power, had already
splintered both the Sadr and Hakim blocs in Iraq, pushing key military actors away from
their political wings. He did this by co-opting the Badr Brigade to join his government and
empowering Asaeb Ahlil Haq in order to weaken his biggest Shia rivals Moqtada al-Sadr
and Ammar al-Hakim.
7
As the Syrian crisis escalated, many Sunnis in Iraq sensed an opportunity to challenge
the government and the Shia saw a threat to the post-2003 political order in Baghdad.
Shia militias were mobilized to fight in Syria, and by early 2014, months before ISIS
took over Mosul, hundreds began returning to help contain the jihadists who were
gaining ground in Iraq. These militias not only assisted the Iraqi security forces, they also
spearheaded many of their security operations. Senior army officers could not challenge
these groups because they knew they had the backing of Maliki and even more powerful
sponsors in Iran.
Popular Mobilization Forces and a historic fatwa
In June 2014, Maliki created the Popular Mobilization Committee, the Hashd Al-
Shaabi, to serve as the official umbrella for various militia groups to operate in support of
the Iraqi security forces. Overnight, the militias went from being unofficial armed groups
to a state-sponsored paramilitary force.
Another key development was the June 13 fatwa of Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf. He
called on Iraqis to bear arms and defend Iraq from ISIS. Though much of the regional
and international media spun the call to arms as a Shia call to arms against Sunnis, the
statement by Sistani was actually made with secular terms of reference, not just religious.
He called on all Iraqi “citizens” to protect and defend Iraq.
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I met Sistani the day after he
issued his fatwa, and he clarified that even the call to defend “Iraq’s sacred sites” was not a
reference to only the Shia shrines, but Sunni, Christian and other places of worship. ISIS,
Sistani said, was “a threat to all in Iraq.”
To put this historic fatwa into perspective, it is worth noting that the last time the
religious establishment made a similar call to arms was 100 years ago when the British
7 Al-Khoei H (2012). Decoding Iraq’s Sectarian Rivalries.
Foreign Affairs
, 31 January.
8 Al-Khatteeb L, Kadhim A (2014). What do you know about Sistani’s fatwa.
Huffington Post
, 10 July.