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Hayder al-Khoei
southern provinces acted as a wake up call to the government. Though there were fears
that destabilizing elements would exploit these protests, they were, by and large, peaceful
and cross-sectarian in nature.
10
On 7
th
August, Ayatollah Sistani made the unusual and uncharacteristic move of singling
out Abadi by name and criticizing him for not doing enough to push the reforms that he
had promised. Sistani warned Abadi to be “bolder and more courageous” in combating
corruption. The real message, however, was aimed at Abadi’s rivals and partners. The
instruction to Abadi to “name those who stand in the way” of reform was essentially a
warning to everyone else to move out of the way and allow the Prime Minister to get the
ball rolling.
11
In a rare written statement, Sistani also warned Iraq’s politicians that the
country would face dire consequences – including possible “partition” if “true reform is not
realized by fighting corruption without mercy”.
12
Though Abadi responded very positively to Sistani’s message by scrapping a third of
cabinet posts
13
, his reform initiatives are only going to be so successful.
14
Abadi essentially
is going to combat the very system that put him in power. The real obstacles in his reform
efforts are going to be those closest to him, starting with his own circle, political party and
his Shia partners in government. The shrinking of cabinet, and sacking over 100 director
generals from various ministries is a welcome step in the right direction, but it is not going
to fundamentally change the systematic corruption that plagues Iraq unless some big heads
start to roll. Though Abadi has been given a boost by both Najaf and a largely supportive
protest movement that welcomed his reform, it remains to be seen whether or not he is
strong enough to move against increasingly powerful rivals, and partners.
Given all these challenges, Abadi faces a mammoth task and many view this as Iraq’s last
chance. There is a sense now across Iraq now that if Abadi fails, Iraq is finished. It may seem
like a slightly sensationalist assessment but it reflects the real fears of many across Iraq.
Iraq’s future
Today, the question of what will happen next with the Popular Mobilisation forces is
inextricably linked to the future of the Iraqi state itself. If ISIS is dealt a heavy blow, and
the Iraqi state is able to once again reassert its control over one-third of its territory which
it lost in June 2014, it is likely that the Shia-dominated paramilitary forces will be split
and the schism may be as deadly as the violence Iraq witnessed in 2008. The wording
of Sistani’s fatwa, which mobilized the majority of the fighters, was limited to a form of
collective responsibility in Shia jurisprudence known as
wajib kifa’i
, which can roughly
be understood as needing enough men for as long as is needed to confront the danger. If
10 Habib M (2015). Senior Iraqi cleric “saves” the Government – And Iraq from Iran?
Niqash
, 12 August.
11 Al-Masdar (2015). “Sistani representative to Abadi: be brave in combating corruption and name those
who impede reform”, 7 August. Author’s translation.
12 Merhi KA, Dunlop WG (2015). Iraq could face “partition” without reform: top Shiite cleric. Agence
France-Presse, 20 August.
13 Dunlop WG (2015). Iraq PM scraps third of cabinet posts in reform drive. Agence France-Presse, 16
August.
14 Al-Ali Z (2015). Premature excitement about Iraq’s new government reforms.
Washington Post
, 14 August.