IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS

51 / 92

Daesh in Syria: major potential for expansion
49
structure of patriarchy and tribalism, for their own benefit.13 But it does not overlook
traditional territorial structures: tribal chiefs are asked to marry their daughters to Islamic
State’s “emirs” and to send their sons to fight in their ranks. As a result, the entire support
network tips towards Daesh, which risks complicating any counter-insurgency strategy
based on Sunni tribes – like that used by General Petraeus in 2006.
How far can the international coalition go in supporting the
Kurds in Syria?
Following their victory in Kobane, the Kurds managed to take back most of the region’s
villages, deserted by those who fled to Turkey before the advancing Daesh. The US supported
PYD in Syria because they fought Daesh, despite the fact that this movement is linked
to the PKK, which is on the official list of terrorist organisations. The fight against Daesh
and US pragmatism has overcome moral considerations. Support was given without any
commitments from PYD as the US needed effective supporters to fight Daesh in Syria. This
questions the situation of the Free Syrian Army – who had received US support since the start
of the Syrian crisis. In fact, the West has run out of supporters in a Syrian rebellion that has
become dominated by fundamentalist groups. In collaboration with Turkey, the US decided
to train “moderate” fighters to fight against Islamic State, and, at Turkey’s express request,
against Bashar al-Assad (without great conviction). But it is not enough to train Syrian rebels;
they also need to want to fight, and they have no desire to confront Daesh.
Rebels likely to fight Daesh are those whose territory is under threat or who were
involved in fighting in the winter of 2013-2014, an episode that left its mark in the Aleppo
region. The West can therefore only count on resistance to Daesh where locals are under
threat, but it is impossible to rely on these rebel groups to go on the offensive. What’s more,
these rebel groups share the same fundamentalist ideology as Daesh (al-Nusra and Ahrar
al-Sham), and the Pentagon cannot arm them. Al-Nusra and its allies recently eliminated
acceptable groups to prevent the West from using them as support.
As a result the PYD is the only remaining option – their Marxist-Leninist ideology is
unlikely to bring them alongside Daesh. But their objective is not to advance as far as
Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor to chase Daesh out. Like the Iraqi Peshmerga, their aim is to
free Kurdish territory from the Arabs so as to build a single autonomous region stretching
from Afyrn to the Tigris, which involves occupying Arab (Tell Abyad and Jarabulus) and
Turkmen (Azaaz) territory, pushing these populations into the arms of Daesh. After re-
taking Kobane, the PYD’s objective is to join up with the Kurdish canton of Jezireh. To do
so, they need to take Tell Abyad, a small city with a majority Arab population.
In the spring of 2013, the PYD seized control of Tell Abyad for a few days, angering the
Arab population who called on Daesh for help. The Kurdish militia fighters were rapidly
chased from the city, along with the Kurdish families living in Tell Abyad, whose houses
were pillaged then burned. A return of PYD Kurdish militiamen could be accompanied by
these families’ revenge, forcing the city’s Arabs to flee.
13 Lund A (2014). Who are the Soldiers of the Islamic State? In: Carnegie Endowment [online]. Available
in: