IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS

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Fabrice Balanche
are Sunni Muslims, for al-Baghdadi does not find their form of Islam sincere. It is true
that the Marxist-Leninist Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) domination over Syrian Kurds
indicates a distance from religion that is tantamount to apostasy for the jihadis. But not all
Kurds are militant atheist Marxists, most Syrian Kurds are believers.
As for the Shiites, they are simply to be eliminated as heretics. After centuries of
domination, Sunnis in Iraq have been unable to bear the Shiite rise to power following the
fall of Saddam Hussein. In Syria, the Sunni majority contest Alawite domination resulting
from the 1963 Baathist revolution. This is one of the parameters of the Syrian revolt. In the
Euphrates valley, a few Shiite communities have in fact recently converted from the Sunni
faith, under the influence of Iranian preaching. The Iranians have founded mosques across
Syria, along the route of the prisoners (Hussein’s wives and daughters who were taken to
Damascus in captivity after the battle of Karbala), or to commemorate Shiite wisemen.
This is the case in Raqqah where the construction of a major Shiite tomb in the 1990s led
to the conversion of a few hundred families in the region.11 Those that did not flee before
Daesh arrived were massacred. This was the case in the village of Hatlah,12 which lies
between Deir ez-Zor and Raqqah, in June 2013.
Raqqah, Tabaqa andDeir ez-Zor are home toChristian communities, notably descendants
of the survivors of the 1915 Armenian genocide, when the Ottomans led Anatolian Armenians
into the Syrian desert and left them to die of hunger. In principle, Christians are considered
“people of the Book” and should be tolerated as dhimmi, so long as they pay a special tax: the
jizya. In Deir ez-Zor, the Armenian memorial complex and the city’s churches have been
destroyed. The city church in Raqqah is closed and the few remaining Christian families
have been banned from practising their faith. Most of the Christian population has fled
Daesh-held territory, as their safety may come under threat at any time – Christian Assyrians
in the Khabur valley are subject to murderous raids and hostage-taking missions.
Daesh wants to eliminate any community that could be used to support a later re-
conquest: the Sinjar Yazidis are seen as heretics, but the mountain range in this part of Iraq
is above all a strategic location that threatens Mosul and ensures continuity between Syrian
and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish enclave of Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) is hindering Daesh
progress towards Aleppo; it is therefore vital to eliminate this threat before making progress
towards the South West. Al-Salamiyah, to the East of Hama, is inhabited by Ismailis
(Shiites) and Alawites, and will surely be the next target, more because of its strategic
position on the new route connecting Homs to Aleppo than due to its “heretic” population.
Al-Baghdadi wants to reign over a territory cleansed of non-Arab and non-Sunni elements
to guarantee his security: he is not interested in Baghdad, with its Shiite majority, unlike
Aleppo, which is a more accessible target.
As in Iraq, in Syria Daesh is made up of local fighters, primarily recruited from the
younger members of the lower classes, who dream of reversing the traditional power
11 Ababsa M (2001). Les mausolées invisibles : Raqqa ville de pèlerinage chiite ou pôle étatique en Jazîra
syrienne? [Invisible Mausoleums: Raqqa, City of Shiite Pilgrimage or a Pole for the State in Syrian
Jazira]. Annales de Géographie. No. 622, pp. 662-79.
12 Available in:
syrie-massacre-de-60-chiites-dans