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Daesh in Syria: major potential for expansion
45
itself, leading to waste and blockages as soon as the state reduced the money for maintaining
and extending the irrigation programme. At the same time, the local population continued
to grow due to high birth rates. Social unrest and the archaic nature of local society were
particularly favourable to Daesh, which, having eliminated Baathist regime troops and
secular opponents, imposed “authentic” Salafism on the population. It is worth underlining
that the traditional way of life was not far removed from the lifestyle preached by Daesh,
supported by a particularly strict form of Sharia law.
4
Establishing Islamic courts is Daesh’s best weapon when it comes to seducing the
population. Having been ignored by the previous system,
5
victims of its arbitrary and
corrupt nature, the lower classes regained their dignity under Daesh. Justice is fast and
rulings are executed immediately. Nobody breaks the law and security reins in Daesh-held
territory. Security is the primary demand of populations afflicted by three years of fighting
– whether this is guaranteed by Daesh or the Syrian government. Daesh is also careful to
provide food to the population. Its first actions were to empty the state’s grain silos to supply
bakeries, which are obliged to provide bread at modest prices. Water, God’s gift, is now free
for farmers in irrigated land, unlike the years leading up to the crisis when irrigation reform
6
accentuated a dissatisfaction heightened by drought and economic liberalisation. The last
twenty years in North East Syria were particularly unstable as the change in economic
policy and the end of major irrigation works hit this agricultural area hard. The villages
expanded with no accompanying increase in public service or employment. The lack of
water for irrigation and its increasing cost prompted thousands of peasant farmers to leave
their lands, with no hope of finding work in the boomtowns. Paradoxically, North Eastern
Syria is the main oil producing region in Syria, generating immense frustration among
the local population. While Syria is not Iraq (it only produces 380,000 barrels a day), this
situation led to all kinds of fantasies. Local inhabitants believed that the large numbers of
Alawites in the Syrian Petrol Company were stealing their riches.
Control of Syria’s oil wells
Islamic State also re-distributes some of the finance from the Gulf’s oil monarchies,
rich private admirers or the states themselves – when they share strategic interests. But it
is not satisfied with external resources – which make it too dependent, so it also taxed the
movement of goods and trade and confiscated goods belonging to displaced populations.
Petrol sales play a role in Daesh’s financial autonomy.
As of spring 2015, control of the oil wells in the Euphrates valley between Deir ez-
Zor and al-Bukamal provide a new source of revenue estimated as worth $1-2 million
4 Ababsa M (2009). La recomposition des allégeances tribales dans le Moyen-Euphrate syrien (1958-2007).
[The re-working of tribal allegiances in Syria’s Middle Euphrates Region]. In: Bonte P, Ben Hounet Y.
La
tribu à l’heure de la globalisation, Etudes rurales [Tribes in Globalisation, Rural Studies].
July-December,
No. 184. Paris: EHESS, pp. 65-78.
5 Balanche F (2011). Géographie de la révolte syrienne [Geography of the Syrian Revolution].
Outre Terre
.
No. 27, September.
6 Balanche F (2013). Le programme de modernisation de l’irrigation en Syrie [The Programme to
Modernise Irrigation in Syria].
Méditerranée
. Montpellier: Spring, 2013.