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Nur Cetinoglu Harunoglu
In fact, Turkey’s approach vis-à-vis Iraq in the 1990s was confirmed by consecutive
resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, which
took place between 16 January and 28 February 1991, and which ensured the withdrawal of
Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait while leaving Saddam Hussein in power in Baghdad, Turkey
continued to maintain the embargo against Iraq despite its economic losses, in tandem
with the UN. Turkey also supported the establishment of UNSCOM, a special commission
responsible for inspecting Iraq’s compliance to disarmament through the destruction of its
Weapons of Mass Destruction facilities. Most important of all, during this period Turkey did
not refrain from initiating with France the establishment of a “safe haven” in Northern Iraq,
a special zone exempted from Iraq’s sovereignty to protect Kurdish civilians from the Iraqi
leader’s repressive measures. The roots of this project launched by Turkey can be traced
back to 1988. In fact, 1988 was a hard year for Turkey, as it had to deal with thousands of
Kurdish refugees fleeing from the Kurdish town of Halabja, where Saddam Hussein had
ordered the use of chemical weapons – notably poison gas – against the Kurds. In addition
to the atrocities suffered by the population in Halabja due to the use of chemical weapons,
Turkey faced tremendous social, economic and security-related problems in the aftermath
of the Halabja massacres. From Turkey’s perspective, a similar crisis could probably occur
in the aftermath of the Gulf War, leaving the country facing a humanitarian crisis. Despite
contending approaches in Turkish Parliament and many discussions on the establishment of
such a special zone in Northern Iraq,
6
this zone was established in 1991 through Operation
Provide Comfort and continued to exist until the war in 2003.
F
rom containment
to deterrence
The main concern shaping Turkey’s approach vis-à-vis Iraq during the rest of the 1990s
dwelt upon the probability of the central government in Baghdad losing its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, potentially fuelling similar aspirations among the almost 15 million Kurds
living in Turkey. Indeed, all the steps taken by Turkey up until then, and which were also in
conformity with the resolutions of the UN Security Council, had undermined the authority
of the central government in Baghdad, a fact that was directly felt by Turkey. In particular,
the fact that Turkey faced crucial security problems due to the growing terrorist activities
of the PKK, a Kurdish separatist terrorist organization in Turkey active since 1984 and
emanating from Northern Iraq, in subsequent years revealed the difficulty for Turkey to act
in conformity with human and global security while preserving its own national interests and
national security. Although Turkey had been engaged to contain Saddam Hussein through
various strategies ranging from the economic to the political, and had been involved in Iraq
in tandem with international powers, Turkey would balance its involvement to protect its
national interests in the ensuing years. The policy hitherto applied by Turkey towards the
central government in Baghdad could be defined as “deterrence” in the eyes of the latter,
which also had a negative impact on Turkey. Therefore, Turkey’s main purpose in the
following years would be to balance this deterrence with inducements towards Baghdad.
6 See, for instance,
Turkish Grand National Assembly Official Reports
. Period. 19, Vol. 26, 24 December
1992, p. 419.