IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS

Nur Cetinoglu Harunoglu

The Iraq War in 2003 and its aftermath

Turkey’s balanced strategy synchronically applied towards Baghdad and Erbil sought to

preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty, but was unable to solve Turkey’s

security problems with the PKK,

which continued in the 2000s. Nevertheless, Turkey’s

efforts to reconcile human and global security with its own national interests and security,

despite all its shortcomings in the early 2000s, faced a critical impediment when the US

adopted unilateralism and pre-emptive strikes as its main foreign policy strategy after 9/11.

In effect, the fact that with the invasion of Iraq the US became a protagonist in the Middle

Eastern stage has been the second challenge for post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy.

Since then, it has become difficult for Ankara to adopt a balanced strategy reconciling both

human and global security requirements with those of its national security.

Turkey’s approach towards Iraq after 2003 was consolidated within the framework of

the power vacuum created in Iraq by the invasion, which required a more comprehensive

approach. Despite US insistence, Turkey did not participate in the invasion of Iraq by the

US-led “coalition of the willing” between 20 March and 1 May 2003, which also lacked

UN Security Council authorization and the support of world public opinion in general.

Nevertheless, Turkey did not refrain from adopting at least a partial involvement policy in

the re-construction process of Iraq after the invasion, a motivation that was mainly due to

growing concerns amidst Turkish decision makers regarding potential loss of control in Iraq.

Indeed, the US alliance with the Iraqi Kurds in the process of overthrowing SaddamHussein’s

regime revealed significant suspicions in Turkey relating to the future of Iraq. According to

the overriding perception in Turkey, the likelihood of the rise of Kurdish aspirations to form

an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, which could also trigger a similar trend

among Kurds in Turkey, was the incontrovertible consequence of the collapse of the regime

in 2003.

This overriding concern in Turkey, mainly based on the territorial integrity of

Iraq and therefore on Turkey’s national security, was quite successful in rekindling Turkey’s

dormant concerns about Iraq during the 1990s, and old questions resurfaced in the Turkish

Parliament regarding the foreign policy Turkey had to adopt towards Iraq.

urkey

the

KRG

and

the

urdish opening

After long periods of discussions, Turkey’s approach vis-à-vis Iraq manifested itself

through a much more comprehensive policy that aimed to transform Turkey into

a strategic neighbour for Iraq, able to control and even lead regional affairs in the

Middle East in general, and the internal dynamics of Iraq in particular. Turkey’s active

10 In effect, Turkey’s terrorism problem with the PKK constituted one of the country’s most fragile problems

during the 1990s. The increasing number of terrorist attacks against not only Turkish soldiers and

policemen but also civilians prompted a strong reaction within Turkish public opinion against the PKK,

while the PKK argued that it was acting in the name of the Kurdish population in Turkey whose political

and social rights had long been disregarded by the Turkish state. For a detailed analysis of the Kurdish

problem in Turkey in the 1990s, see Barkey H (1997). Turkey’s Kurdish question: critical turning points

and missed opportunities.

Middle East Journal.

Vol. 51, No.1, 1997, pp. 59-79.

11 On the contending approaches in the Turkish Parliament on the verge of the invasion, see, for example,