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only determined by security concerns but also through economic needs.
14
In that regard,
it is possible to argue that the intensification of relations with the EU played an important
role in Turkey’s rapprochement with the KRG, not only through democratization reforms
for the Kurds of Turkey but also through the increasing number of economic initiatives
adopted by Turkey for the benefit of the KRG.
It seems appropriate to mention here that Turkey’s main motivation for reconciling
human-global security with its own national interests and security was consolidated after
2003 with the country’s comprehensive approach towards Iraq, including institutionalized
relations with the KRG and democratization reforms within Turkey. Nevertheless,
this strategy did not progress smoothly and Turkey faced significant difficulties in
the subsequent years. The problem between the JDP and the Maliki government in
Baghdad on the protection in Turkish territory of the former Sunni vice-president of
Iraq, Tariq Al-Hashimi, who was sentenced to death in his home country, was the first
of these difficulties. The tension between Ankara and Baghdad mounted when Turkey
began to cooperate with the KRG on energy matters, to the extent that it became an
uncomfortable matter for central government in Baghdad. Indeed, for the first time in
their diplomatic relations, an Iraqi prime minister declared that Iraq would take action
against Turkey for cooperating with the KRG, which it saw as a material breach of Iraq’s
constitution, as well as for intervening in the internal affairs of Iraq.
15
It seems possible to
state here that Turkey attempted to apply a balanced strategy based on both inducements
and deterrence towards Baghdad and Northern Iraq during the 1990s but it is obvious
that maintaining this balance became much more complicated for Turkey after 2003.
The gravity of the situation for Turkey lies in the difficulty in maintaining stable relations
with both Baghdad and Erbil.
At this point, it is also worth highlighting the role played by the JDP, which has
been in power in Turkey since 2002. Particularly in the period when Ankara and
Baghdad had tense relations between 2012 and 2014, the JDP received strong criticism
for having damaged Turkey’s balanced approach towards Iraq. The opposition political
parties and many experts in the domestic politics of Turkey, as well as foreign policy
experts, suggested that the JDP had launched a superficial democratization process to
gain the votes of Kurdish nationalist parties in the elections and had therefore used
the Kurdish issue as an instrument to consolidate power for itself. The fact that the
JDP embarked on what several analysts consider a sectarian policy has also attracted
substantial criticism. Recently, Turkey’s late reaction to the rise of ISIS, an extreme
Sunni terrorist organization operating in the northern regions of both Iraq and Syria,
has aggravated the existing criticism, sparking new discussions on Turkey’s foreign policy
and also revealing its Achilles’ heel due to the comprehensive approach that Turkey had
internalized towards Iraq from 2003 onwards.
14 Kirisci K (2009). The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: the rise of the trading state.
New Perspectives
on Turkey,
No. 40, pp. 29-57.
15 Irak, Türkiye’ye dava açacak”, [Iraqi will proceed against Turkey].
Milliyet
[A Turkish daily newspaper].
18 January 2014.