IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS

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Jean-Loup Samaan
by the US military withdrawal from Iraq and the fragmentation of Syria progressively left
room for local militias to gain control of vast areas of both countries.
In June 2014, after months of indecisive attempts by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL)3 to capture major cities in Iraq, the group took control of Mosul and Tikrit.
Despite American expectations, the Iraqi Army proved incapable of holding its territory and,
by the end of the same month, ISIL had announced the creation of its caliphate.
The murder of American journalist James Foley in late August 2014 then triggered
the creation of a US strategy against ISIL. A few weeks later, President Obama delivered
a speech to the nation from the State Floor of the White House that could be marked as
a milestone in the US strategy vis-à-vis ISIL. Obama said in clear terms: “Our objective
is clear: we will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and
sustained counterterrorism strategy”.4 He emphasized the trigger for US action: “This is
a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven”.
According to official documents, this strategy includes five lines of effort: providing
military support to local partners; impeding the flow of foreign fighters; stopping ISIL’s
financing and funding; addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and exposing
ISIL’s true nature.5
Nevertheless, the US strategy remains mainly a military one. The logic is twofold: at
strategic level, building a wide coalition of allied countries and partners on the ground to
avoid a massive American footprint; and at operational level, relying primarily on the use
of airstrikes to stop ISIL’s momentum.
Coalition games
As the Obama administration made sure that it would not get bogged down in a new
war in the Middle East, it tried as much as possible to share the burden of the fight against
ISIL. To that end, it quickly reached out to its international allies and partners so as to
build a coalition. Obama appointed retired General John Allen to be his Special Envoy
to coordinate with coalition partners. A former commander of US forces in Afghanistan,
Allen had publicly called for an American response earlier in 2014.6
According to the State Department, up to 60 countries are today members of the
coalition. The number may seem impressive, but in many cases this is token participation
for diplomatic purposes. This is reminiscent of the situation in 2003, when the Bush
administration built a “coalition of the willing” to launch the invasion of Iraq that included
no less than 49 members. This time, according to sources in US Central Command, only
“about 30 really play[ed] a role at the operational level”.7
3 The group is also known as “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS), as the “Islamic State” (IS) or by its
Arabic acronym Dae’esh, which stands for Dawlat Islamyya lil Iraq wa ach-Cham. On 14 May 2014, the
US Department of State announced its decision to use “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) as the
group’s primary name, making this the most commonly used name in security politics. This is the name
used in the present paper.
4 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on ISIL, 10 September 2014.
5 US Department of State. The five lines of effort. Available in:
6 Allen J (2014). Destroy the Islamic State Now. Defense One, 20 August 2014.
7 Interview with the author, Doha, February 2015.