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The EU’s diverging strategy for a changing Iraq
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activities within Europe itself. Moreover, with only 210 miles between Damascus and the
nearest European capital, and the continued trafficking of people and money through a
porous Turkish-Syrian border, the EU has become deeply concerned about the flow of
foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq crossing into Europe by both land and sea.
Deeping the EU’s concern is the growing trend of ISIL affiliated attacks beginning to occur
within the borders of the Eurozone. Following Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s calls to “capture Rome”,
in July 2014, there have beenmultiple ISIL inspired attacks, ranging from themurder of Charlie
Hebdo, an attack on a kosher supermarket and an attempt to blow up a gas factory in France.
These attacks in Paris followed the May 2014 murder of four people at the Jewish Museum in
Brussels, vividly demonstrating a strong anti-Semitic current behind the attacks within Europe.
Indeed, this trend became all the more evident in February 2015 when a gunman targeted a
synagogue, along with a café hosting a free speech discussion, inCopenhagen. BeyondEurope’s
Jewish community, other ethnically motivated violence has spilt into European streets, with
clashes between pro-ISIL supporters and members of the Kurdish community in the German
city of Hamburg. As such, European security fears are not simply focused on terrorist attacks
themselves but also seek to maintain social cohesion and order as the ethnic and religious fault
lines from the MENA become felt directly within the EU.
This situation raises particularly pertinent question for Europe’s Iraq strategy and how
Europe deals with the consequences of the crisis. US government estimations put the flow of
foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq at approximately 20,000 individuals from around the globe
(Archick
et al.
, 2015, pp. 4-5). Whilst it is estimated that only around 150 of these individuals
are from the US, various estimations place between 3000-4000 EU citizens as having crossed
into Syria and Iraq globe (Archick
et al.
, 2015, pp. 4-5). The potential return of these individuals
to Member States, and within Europe’s Schengen Area, raises internal security risks to the EU.
Their return also provides the basis for a larger transatlantic threat, as twenty-three Member
States participate in the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) globe (Archick
et al.
, 201o, pp. 38-9).
Working through both the EU system and the UN, European governments have been
quick to act. In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
2170, calling on UN Member States to “suppress the flow of foreign fighters, financing and
other support to Islamist extremist groups in Iraq and Syria” the EU has rapidly attempted
to make up for lost time in dealing with the threat from ISIL and affiliated groups within
its southern neighbourhood (Security Council, 2014). Under the purview of the Justice
and Home Affairs Council (JHA), which deals with cooperation and common policies on
various cross-border issues, the EU has outlined a series of more detailed policies designed
to deal with foreign fighters and returnees (Security Council, 2014). Under the categories of
“prevention of radicalization”, the “identification and detection of travel”, “criminal justice
response”, and “cooperation with third countries” the EU is developing a more coherent
and integrated internal and peripheral strategy (Security Council, 2014, pp. 2-20). As a
result, the EU has come to see this internal strategy as “an integral part of the EU regional
strategy” (Security Council, 2015; p. 3). This strategy certainly reflects the blurring and
porous nature of the EU’s borders. However, it is also a product of the EU having higher-
level competencies within and around its borders, which allow it to construct governance