The EU’s diverging strategy for a changing Iraq
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economic growth, employment, poverty reduction, with resources to promote equitable
economic and social development”; and “Iraq’s economic and political integration into
the wider region and the international economic system” (European Comission, 2011, p.
7). However, these objectives and the EU’s Iraq strategy have been thrown into turmoil by
a growing crisis in Iraq and the rise of ISIL.
As the EU adapts to the realities of a changing political and security situation in
Iraq, Member States have increasingly sought to work together in recognition that the
2012 framework agreement has faltered. The EU’s aim has been to develop a more
comprehensive strategy to the region that is able to deal with increasing complexity within
Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood and the growing dangers emerging from Iraq and Syria.
This has not only led to the development of Europe’s 2015
Regional Strategy for Syria, Iraq
and the ISIL/Da’esh Threat
, but also the EU backing US-led coalition airstrikes on ISIL
targets. Problematically, however, the EU’s external approach to Iraq remains limited and
thin on tangible details. For example, the European Council’s March 2015 conclusions on
Iraq amounted to a mere four paragraphs. This was meagre even compared to the twelve
paragraphs concluding the EU’s approach to Syria (European Council, 2015). Moreover,
it is clear that the EU has moved towards its more comfortable diplomatic approach of
misconstruing concrete strategy with declaratory policy.
The EU has made clear that it supports Iraqi unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and has called on governments in the region to do the same in support of the Iraqi
government and the restoration of peace and stability. The EU has also called on Iraqi
society to fight against ISIL, whilst urging a comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue
and reconciliation process take place. Similarly, the EU has maintained the need for all
armed groups in Iraq to come under the control of the Iraqi state, and that Iraqi Security
Forces in turn become inclusive and democratically controlled. Where the EU has been
more specific, is in its traditional and comfortable humanitarian role, pledging to increase
the level of urgent humanitarian aid to Iraq from the €163 million provided in 2014
(European Council, 2015, pp. 10-1). Reverting to this declaratory and humanitarian role
demonstrates the limits of the EU’s external capabilities. Europe is struggling to define both
its role and a clear strategy to the changing external relationship with Iraq. At the core of
EU-Iraq policy still lays the 2012 framework for cooperation agreement that is provisional
and being applied on a partial basis. With this framework being applied incrementally,
there is a risk that the EU’s external Iraq strategy becomes subsumed into an “ISIL strategy”
as Europe’s focus turns towards a domestic terrorism agenda. That is to say, that the EU
and its Member States are increasing constituting their Iraq policies through the prism of
rising threats to Europe itself.
The EU’s internal Iraq strategy
In April 2013, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, splinter forces from the
al-Nusra Front fighting in Syria and the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) merged to form ISIL.
Within months, ISIL began focusing on taking territory in Iraq, and with the assistance of
tribal networks and former Baathist regime loyalists, the group was able to seize control of