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structures that its weaker external instruments do not allow. Similarly, within the current
international environment and the emergent threat within the Eastern Neighbourhood,
there have been concerns that attention has been diverted away from Iraq and the Southern
Neighbourhood more broadly (Politi and Barker, 2015). As a result of these factors, there
is a very real risk that the EU’s Iraq strategy has become “internalized” and predominantly
focused on ISIL.
A diverging two-tier strategy
Whilst the EU’s 2012 framework agreement with Iraq remains in place, the instability
of the Iraqi government in Baghdad has led to regression on issues of combating terrorism,
countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting human rights. As
a result, the EU has moved towards declaratory policy making, which is a demonstration of
its limited external capabilities and inability to meet new and emerging threats beyond its
borders. It would of course be a mistake to assert that the EU, or indeed the US, can provide
the solution to the Iraq crisis and the rise of ISIL. However, the EU’s neglect of Iraq for over
a decade, and hesitance in accepting that the old geopolitical order in the region is eroding,
has meant that the EU has been particularly slow in constructing a detailed response to
the crisis. This has undermined the EU as an international actor capable of playing a more
positive role vis-à-vis Iraq. This is further undermined by a conflict between the EU calling
for the promotion of human rights in its external relations with Iraq, whilst allowing its Iraq
strategy to become subsumed by its emphasis on ISIL and refugees at home.
With many EU governments concerned about migration and the costs of rescuing
refugees in the Mediterranean, the Italian-led air and sea search and rescue mission, termed
Operation Mare Nostrum, ended in October 2014. In its place, Frontex has conducted
Operation Triton, which is predominantly focused on border protection. There was a shift in
focus from a policy that had a core humanitarian objective to one focusing predominantly
on security issues. The consequences of this shift became evident in early 2015, which saw
a threefold increase in the number of refugee deaths in the Mediterranean; rising from 588
in the first six months of 2014, to 1867 in 2015 (
The Guardian
, 2015). Whilst the EU has
begun trying to organize greater cooperation between Member States, it is clear that it is
struggling to deal with a significant refugee crisis. There is clearly a tension within the EU’s
external and internal approaches to the crisis in Syria and Iraq as a result. Externally in Iraq,
the EU is calling for the respect of human rights and providing humanitarian assistance, but
as the problems from the region approach Europe’s edge, the EU has shifted to favouring
security whilst many Member States fail to provide adequate humanitarian assistance for
refugees. Symptomatic of the diverging approach is Britain’s role in actively carrying out
and humanitarian rescue missions in Iraq, participating in a bombing campaign against
ISIL, and seeking further involvement in Syria, whilst only accepting 187 refugees from the
conflict and refusing to participate in a wider European refugee redistribution scheme. The
EU and its Member States failure to provide a coherent, detailed and consistent agreement
over how to respond to the crisis in Iraq is therefore some way off, and is feeling the strain of
new and evolving international challenges.