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Arab revolutions and a resurgent Russia, and internal challenges from a possible “Grexit” and
“Brexit”, it would appear that the crisis in Iraq is happening at a deeply challenging time for
the union. Moreover, with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also
known as Daesh or ISIS, it would appear that the EU is paying a price for its inattention, as a
serious threat within the Southern Neighbourhood has emerged. It is within this context that
the EU’s evolving Iraq, Syria and ISIL strategy has emerged. Identifying the contemporary
challenges to the EU’s external and internal security, Europe has sought to devise a more
comprehensive strategy in response to the crises in Iraq and the wider region. However,
what has emerged is a two-tier strategy where the EU has retreated to a more comfortable
declaratory policy with regards to external relations with Iraq, and internally, is increasingly
conflating its “Iraq strategy” with a domestic “ISIL strategy”. These two-tiers risk diverging in
if the EU fails to recognize the growing tensions within its strategy. Moreover, allowing this to
happen would be a mistake that risks undermining the EU as a significant actor in Iraq and
in a wider environment of new and evolving international challenges.
The EU’s external Iraq strategy
The EU’s external strategy for the post-Saddam Iraq has been developing incrementally.
It began gently in 2004 with the
EU and Iraq: a framework for engagement
plan and the 2005
EU-Iraq joint declaration on political dialogue
. However, it was not until PrimeMinister Nouri
al-Maliki’s period in office, which succeeded the Iraqi Transitional Authority in 2006, that
the EU was able to gain at least a modicum of traction towards creating a closer relationship.
Initially, this was evident in the European Commission’s 2006
Recommendations for renewed
European Union engagement with Iraq.
This progressive trend was continued in 2010, when
the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with regards to strategic energy cooperation.
This was intended to act as a “political framework for reinforcing energy relations” (Europa,
2010). Yet, this was only an outline of the potential shape cooperation could take, with Iraq
prospectively becoming a “natural gas supplier for the Southern Corridor” and as “an energy
bridge between the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the EU” (Europa 2010). It was
approaching nearly a decade after the US invasion when the EU and Iraq signed their first
ever framework agreement. The
EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
, signed in
May 2012, aimed at establishing a “comprehensive platform” ranging from “political matters
such as countering terrorism and promoting human rights, to trade and investment in key
areas such as energy and services” (Europa, 2012).
Upon signing the 2012 framework agreement, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, remarked that “This agreement is
above all a symbol of the EU’s wish to be a positive partner for Iraq in its democratic efforts.
It is a fitting testament to the EU’s determination to build a long-term partnership, not just
today or tomorrow, but for many years to come” (Europa, 2012).
This statement was in linewithwhat theEUtermed its “overallmedium-termobjectives”.
These included “the development of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq where human
rights and fundamental freedoms are respected”; “the establishment of an open, stable,
sustainable and diversified market economy and society as a basis for human security,