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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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which proved disastrous for the develop-
ment of the renewable energy sector in
those countries. These measures severely af-
fected the safety of investment, and thus the
confidence that investors placed in the de-
velopment of renewable energies. This fur-
ther reduces the likelihood of achieving the
20% target by 2020.
Energy efficiency: a lack of ambition
In contrast to the climate protection and renew-
able energy targets, EU energy policy since 2007
has somewhat neglected the energy efficiency
objective. The target formula has been rather
obscure since the beginning because the
European Council merely stipulated in its energy
action plan of 2007 that “energy efficiency in
the EU must be increased, so that [...] the goal
of saving 20% of the EU’s energy consumption
compared to the prognoses for 2020 can be
achieved” (Council of the European Union,
2007). In other words, in 2007 the heads of
state and government did not agree to reduce
their 2007 energy consumption rates by 20%,
but instead agreed on a reduction of the pro-
jected consumption rates for 2020; for a long
time, it was not even clear exactly upon which
projections this agreement was based. This for-
mula, which was not specified further until
Energy Commissioner Oettinger gave it a more
concrete shape, corresponds to the equally
vague final efficiency goal, which serves merely
as a recommendation. The 20% energy savings
target has always been considered to be merely
advisory in nature and –in contrast to the cli-
mate protection and renewable energy targets–
had never been given the shape of a legally
binding regulation in its entirety.
Fundamental controversies
Since the EU Energy Strategy was passed in
2007, the implementation of the 20-20-20 pro-
gram has been at the very center of political at-
tention. Even though a plethora of other initia-
tives have been launched in support of it, none
of them have been particularly successful. This
was made especially obvious by the attempt to
develop a resilient external energy policy for the
EU, which failed comprehensively and is now
hardly ever mentioned. There are still too many
differences between the interests of the 27
Member States, which are primarily responsible
for the security of energy supply. In light of the
mostly domestic focus of individual Member
States’ energy markets, the external energy
policy preferences of individual states depend
mainly on their energy mix and on the specific
import dependency structures at hand (cf.
Geden/Dröge, 2010).
The future development of the EU energy
and climate policy will depend crucially on the
European institutions’ solutions in two funda-
mental but politically contentious areas: first,
the expansion of electricity and natural gas grids
which are crucial for building an internal energy
market in the EU, and second, the increasingly
pressing question of the extent to which the
EU’s energy and climate policy should be based
on coherent long-term planning.
The internal energy market and infrastructure
Since as early as the end of the 1990s, the EU
has pursued its declared goal of creating a fully
integrated market for natural gas and electricity.
After a few mostly failed attempts, much pro-
gress has been made on this project over the
last few years, especially after the Third Internal