THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

outcome of the summit would very much de-

pend on Warsaw’s willingness to compromise.

Thus in the end, it was Poland’s domestic poli-

tics that defined the scope for the EU 2030

framework’s negotiation.

Elements of the 2030 compromise

Although the President of the European

Council, Herman Van Rompuy, had been man-

dated to explore possible pathways for a com-

promise concerning the EU 2030 framework

already in spring 2014, by the beginning of the

European Council meeting on 23 October 2014

only a few components of the package were in

place. Despite Van Rompuy’s numerous bilat-

eral meetings in European capitals, the Visegrád

states led by Poland appeared just as unsatis-

fied with the state of negotiations as other

Member States who wanted to see their indi-

vidual interests reflected in the conclusions. For

example, a group including Spain, Portugal and

the Baltic states, wanted to link their electricity

market more closely with the rest of Europe

and asked for a binding interconnection target.

But they met with strong opposition from

France, which wanted to avoid an obligation to

link the Iberian Peninsula to its electricity mar-

ket. Therefore, not only the overarching target

architecture, but also satisfying individual inter-

ests played a role in finding a compromise for

the whole framework.

In the end, three classical mechanisms

of compromise-building in the European Council

were responsible for the outcome: a high degree

of ambiguity in the formulation of the conclu-

sions; the assurance of being able to change con-

clusions only through consensual intergovern-

mental decisions; as well as extensive financial

transfers and exemptions for the blocking states.

The drafting of compromise formulas in the

European Council is characterized by the princi-

ple that all participants have to be able to save

face at the end of the negotiations. This can

often be achieved only through a high degree of

ambiguity

in formulations that can allow for dif-

ferent interpretations.

For a majority of the Northern and Western

European Member States holding onto the tar-

get triad of emission reduction, expansion of

renewable energies, and increasing energy ef-

ficiency was of great importance in terms of the

reception of their respective national publics. In

the European Council conclusions, all three ar-

eas were treated with quantified targets (40

percent; 27 percent; 27 percent) and an “at

least” formula, which opens the floor for rais-

ing the target at a later date. For energy effi-

ciency, there was even the notice of a possible

change to 30 percent after an assessment in the

coming years. At the same time, the conclusions

also reflect the demands of the Central and

Eastern European Member States as well as the

United Kingdom because neither the renewa-

ble energy target nor the energy efficiency for-

mula will directly influence national decisions

on energy mix and national energy strategies.

Thus no direct implementation on member-

state level is foreseen. Also, the ambition of the

two targets is at the lower end of the spectrum

of negotiating positions – another concession

to the Central and Eastern European Member

States.

Similarly ambiguous is the text on the extent

to which decisions can be revised. The conclu-

sions include a review of the decisions of the

European Council after the climate conference

in Paris in December 2015 (COP 21). In North-

Western member states, this clause was mostly

interpreted as opening the way to increase the

minimum target of a 40 percent reduction in