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UPDATING THE EU’S ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY. THE NEW 2030 FRAMEWORK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
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Even though the Polish government was the
only one to publicly and effectively resist the
adoption of the climate and energy roadmaps,
it can be assumed that a number of other
Eastern and Southern European Member States
share Poland’s reservations. The message spread
publicly by the Commission and many North-
Western European Member States, according to
which 26 of the 27 Member States fully sub-
scribe to an ambitious European climate policy,
is misleading; this becomes very obvious when
looking at the ongoing legislative process for
reforming the emissions trading scheme. It is
true that the biggest objections are once again
being raised by Poland. However, the Polish
government now enjoys the support of several
other governments on this issue, which – unlike
the roadmap conclusions – would require a
blocking minority in the Council of Ministers.
The new framework for 2030
The 2020 targets set important milestones for
the energy industry, which requires medium-
and long-term planning in order to be success-
ful. The 2007 energy strategy symbolized the
sustainable development paradigm pursued by
the European Union which was mostly unques-
tioned at that time. The two other angles of the
energy policy triangle –security of supply and
competitiveness– have been somewhat margin-
alized in energy policy since 2007 because they
are almost impossible to measure objectively on
the basis of quantifiable indicators, and thus
very hard to implement legally. Only the 20-20-
20 targets, which primarily focus on the aspect
of sustainability, are legally and politically bind-
ing. Even in the case of an energy savings goal
that is only advisory in nature, the degree to
which a certain target is reached or missed is
much easier to evaluate than in the case of a
generally phrased objective such as the “com-
pletion of the internal energy market by 2014”
(cf. European Commission, 2012c).
Against this background, the European
Commission’s January 2014 proposals on the EU
2030 framework followed a pragmatic approach
taking new circumstances into account. An
emission reduction target of 40 percent com-
pared to 1990 was accompanied by a target for
the share of renewable energy in the range of 27
percent for 2030. However, this time the renew-
ables target was not supposed to be translated
into national binding targets as in the
2020-framework, but it would rather be binding
at EU level. A new governance mechanism was
proposed to guarantee that the national plans
and the overall EU strategy correspond with one
another. Only in July 2014 did the Commission
propose a new energy efficiency target in the
range of 30 percent by 2030. The designated
European Commission President Jean-Claude
Juncker was explicitly pushing for it.
Since the decision on long-term goals for en-
ergy and climate policy is a fundamental ques-
tion for the strategic development of the policy
field, the 2030 framework debate was shifted
to the level of the heads of state and govern-
ment. It is important to note that the principle
of consensus is the rule for decision-making in
the European Council (Article 15 TEU). This es-
sentially means that there’s a unanimity require-
ment with a veto option for every single govern-
ment. In 2007 and 2008, the 2020 framework
and essential parts of its implementation were
agreed upon under the conditions of this deci-
sion-making procedure.
In view of the consensus rule in the European
Council and the Polish government’s public an-
nouncement to be ready to prevent adverse deci-
sions by using its veto, it became clear that an