THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggested in its

2007 assessment report, outlining how industri-

alized nations could make a fair contribution to

reaching the global two-degree target. However,

Poland in particular has influenced the corre-

sponding EU declarations in such a way that the

80-95% corridor will only apply if all industrial-

ized nations agree on an appropriate reduction

level and if emerging economies and developing

countries commit themselves to significant re-

ductions in greenhouse gas emissions, too. This

illustrates that even in the post-2020 period, the

EU’s internal climate policy will continue to be

closely linked with international negotiations

and their progress.

Shortly before the 2009 Copenhagen

Climate Summit, the European Council put the

Commission in charge of conducting macroeco-

nomic and sector-specific analyses for imple-

menting an emissions reduction path to 2050.

In March 2011, EU Climate Commissioner

Hedegaard first presented a cross-sectoral anal-

ysis called the “Low Carbon Roadmap”

(European Commission, 2011b). Shortly there-

after, a specialized analysis of the effects on the

transport sector followed, and some weeks later

an examination of the energy sector was pre-

sented (European Commission, 2011c and

2011e). In the time after, however, Member

States were unable to pass consensual conclu-

sions, which would have sent a signal to the

international community that despite the eco-

nomic and debt crisis, the EU is not only com-

mitted to the 80-95%mitigation corridor, but is

also willing to agree to ambitious and legally

binding energy and climate goals for the year

2030. In the case of the cross-sector “Low

Carbon Roadmap,” the attempt to reach a con-

sensus failed twice, and in the case of the Energy

Roadmap it failed once. Both of these initiatives

were blocked because the Polish minister in

charge vetoed the proposals. Poland’s unwill-

ingness to compromise came as a surprise to

many, not least because no obligations for

Member States could have been derived from

the Council’s conclusions themselves. Rather,

the conclusions were intended to send a signal

to the Commission about how a proposal that

would be amenable to compromise could be

given a more concrete shape to the EU’s energy

and climate policy for the 2021-2030 period.

Such a signal was long time awaited; in the case

of the transport roadmap, a compromise was

far from reach because among other factors

there are reservations on the part of many

Member States about introducing ambitious

emission reduction goals in a sector that has a

strong influence on domestic elections.

Regardless of its political resonance, the

Commission has nevertheless created an inno-

vative planning tool by submitting three road-

maps, which all contain the same ambitious

emission reduction target for 2050. This plan-

ning tool offers the possibility of illustrating the

consequences of long-term targets for actions

taken in the present (and vice versa). Planning

processes based on macroeconomic models

continue to offer the Commission the possibility

of exercising a significant influence on the struc-

ture of energy and climate debates. One meth-

od of achieving this is by making assumptions

that may be disputable but are rarely questioned

in practice.

As far as Poland is concerned, there are two

main problems. First, the Polish government has

criticized the trend of decoupling European

emissions reduction policies from progress

made in the context of international climate ne-

gotiations. Second, Poland would be faced with

significant pressure to change its domestic en-

ergy mix and high costs for the transformation

process if the roadmaps were implemented.