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UPDATING THE EU’S ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY. THE NEW 2030 FRAMEWORK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
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also depend on the date of the MSR’s introduc-
tion whether the 900 million allowances that
were taken out of the market through the so-
called “backloading mechanism”, should be
reintroduced into the market or flow directly
into the MSR.In this context, the consequences
of the European Council’s engagement with de-
tailed questions of EU climate policy will most
likely be seen for the first time.
Effort-sharing in sectors not covered by the
emissions trading system
About half of the EU-wide emissions are cov-
ered by the EU-wide harmonized ETS (electricity
generation and industry). For the remaining sec-
tors (mainly transport, buildings, agriculture),
Member States have in the past agreed upon a
differentiated effort-sharing based on individual
national commitments. Between 2005 and
2020, emission reductions of 21 percent were
directed through the ETS; 10 percent through
national targets in the other sectors. For 2030
this structure will be maintained, the targets
however will be increased to a 43 percent reduc-
tion through emissions trading and to 30 per-
cent through national measures in the non-ETS
sectors. The European Council has now formu-
lated two criteria by which the national targets
for reaching the 30 percent target shall be de-
fined in the non-ETS sectors: First, the range of
national commitments should be between 0
and 40 percent emission reduction compared to
2005. Second, it should be distributed equally
according to economic performance (using GDP
per capita) as well as with respect to the difficul-
ties of wealthier member states to find cost-ef-
fective mitigation potentials. Given that each
Member State will find arguments for reducing
its own commitment, the distribution of the
overall target is likely to create a major conflict
in which the Central and Eastern European gov-
ernments once again appeal for more solidarity
from the Northern and Western European
countries. Also on this point, the fact that the
European Council is bound to the principle of
unanimity will make it complicated to find a
compromise in the coming months.
Energy Union and governance mechanism
While most of the framework conditions for the
climate policy decisions were already formulated
by the European Council, the Commission will
have to be very creative in developing its pro-
posals on the Energy Union and the governance
mechanism. The leeway provided by the
European Council for the structuring of both
processes initially appears narrow since the
Commission must leave the energy mix of the
Member States untouched. The Energy Union
will have to be built on the basis of existing in-
struments; ultimately, in terms of content, it will
be a continuation of the internal energy market
agenda with a likely extension of measures for
security of gas supply. Thus the project’s impact
could have merely a symbolic effect and act as
a surrogate for an increasingly renationalized
energy policy.
The design of the governance structure will
probably be structured along the lines of the
well-known instrument of the European
Semester. But even the definition of relevant in-
dicators for evaluating national energy plans
will, politically, be a highly sensitive undertaking.
If it were really possible to reach an agreement,
the question of the impact of the Commission’s
recommendations would be another open flank.
As long as it remains mere recommendations,
the process is unlikely to prove effective.
The elaboration of the two projects and the
subsequent political decision-making process