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CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM AND THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION
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southern sea, a vast geopolitical space where
the EU barely has a significant presence.
Putin’s Russia: revising the status quo
Europe’s relations with the Kremlin, which is em-
barked on revising the global status quo, remain
difficult. On the one hand, relations between
Putin and Trump appear to follow a calculated
ambiguity on both sides, which does not give
the Europeans clear clues for taking action. On
the other, Moscow, which remains sheltered
from a trade war waged mainly against China,
poses a challenge to the multilateral system in
that, without openly confronting it yet, it uses it
or ignores it in a selective and instrumental man-
ner to serve its interests. Examples of that are the
development of a mini nuclear bomb, the an-
nexation of Crimea in 2014 or the intervention
in Syria in support of Al-Assad. Yet tension with
the EU has increased above all because of the
covert intervention of Russian agencies in vari-
ous European elections, such as the Brexit refer-
endum in the United Kingdom, the French pres-
idential elections or the elections in Catalonia,
through various propaganda channels and the
use of social media.
The Russian action has exposed the different
stances and sensibilities of the EU Member
States. The fact that officially the EU expresses a
desire to reboot relations has been no impedi-
ment to a broadening and toughening up of the
sanctions related to the ongoing conflicts in
Ukraine and Crimea. In March 2018, the Council
agreed on a six-month extension, to September
2018, of the sanctions for actions against the
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independ-
ence of Ukraine, including the freezing of assets
and a travel ban on officials and bodies. In
December 2017, the economic sanctions on
certain sectors of the Russian economy were ex-
tended to July 2018, based on the information
provided to the European Council by President
Macron and Chancellor Merkel on the state of
the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
However, while the EU is being firm, it does
not seem realistic to demonise Putin’s regime in
view of his overwhelming victory in the presi-
dential elections of March 2018, which could
set him up for more than one term of office.
The Germans and French are taking a firm
stance for now, but they are reluctant to close
the door on a direct strategic understanding be-
tween Brussels and Moscow, without subordi-
nating to Washington or to a London in the
process of leaving the Union. A case that serves
to illustrate the current situation is the crisis
caused by the nerve gas attack on a former
Russian spy and his daughter in Salisbury
(England) in March 2018, allegedly perpetrated
by an agency answering to the Kremlin.
European condemnation, driven by France and,
to a lesser extent, by Germany, backing Theresa
May’s United Kingdom, was not as robust or as
swift as might have been expected, while it was
left to the discretion of each Member State to
expel Russian diplomats or not. At the same
time, the internal debate brought to the surface
the traditional difference of approach between
the countries of the East, the Baltic and the
Scandinavian countries – in favour of tougher
reprisals – and the Mediterranean countries:
Italy, Spain, Greece or Cyprus.
New trade alliances: Canada, Mexico,
Mercosur, Japan
With the TTIP fallen through and America’s pro-
tectionist drift confirmed, the Council,
Commission and Parliament turned quickly to