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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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Acting in a weakened outside and internal
environment
But whatever his ambitions and priorities, the
French President’s European policy is weakened
by two factors, one external, the other internal.
The external one is the current political environ-
ment he encounters. The Sorbonne speech had
been specially delivered right after the German
elections as to influence the next governing
coalition in Berlin and get the Franco-German
engine kick-starting. The Elysée had not fore-
seen – as elsewhere – that the new German
government would take six months to be in
place, delaying its plans to reform Europe.
Although France prefers working with the
“grand coalition” finally sealed rather than the
earlier one that included the liberal FDP, it can-
not rely on a Franco-German axis as strong as
hoped for. Macron’s Sorbonne speech still has
not received a full German reply. He partners
with a weakened Chancellor and a divided SPD.
Yet he needs both.
The Elysée is more worried by the political
situation in Italy, following the elections of March
4th. It will also there not be able to rely much on
this founding Member State of European inte-
gration and traditional ally. The same weakness
is witnessed regarding Spain, whose political at-
tention is captured by the situation in Catalonia.
Macron cannot rely more on Scandinavian coun-
tries who do not fully taste his social agenda and
even less his ambitions for the eurozone. Same
for Eastern European countries, with whom the
French President wants to battle over democrat-
ic values. According to high level sources in
Brussels, France was the strongest supporter of
the Commission’s initiative to put unprecedent
pressure on Warsaw under article 7 procedure.
In this European political context, where the UK
is completely absorbed by Brexit, President
Macron stands as the EU’s main leader but,
en
même temps
, as the only one. A position that
may force him to lower down his ambitions for
Europe. The history of European integration
teaches that, to be successful, a European policy
must be supported by a small but committed
and willing coalition, never by one leader alone.
Mitterrand acted along with Helmut Kohl,
Jacques Delors at the Commission, and other
pro-Eu leaders, such as Felipe González.
The other less known factor weakening
Macron’s European policy is internal. The young
President heads a state whose administration is
much less pro-European than himself. Ideas and
projects that he launches are not always en-
riched and supported as they should be by the
country’s high civil service. For instance, his will-
ingness to facilitate and to encourage mobility
for high school students, according to the
Erasmus model, or to develop European labelled
universities, have not been followed up by initia-
tives from the relevant French ministries, that are
needed to carry out such ideas in Brussels. And
politically, his party has not yet its own supporters
and proper MEPs in the European parliament.
European elections in May 2019 could bring the
first “En Marche” deputies to Strasbourg and
perhaps its own new political group, necessary to
sustain Macron’s European policy.
Developing a pro-EU style and wording
These elections will be the first the French
President faces since the legislative ones that
just followed his own last year. They are strate-
gic not only from a purely partisan perspective
but also to reform the EU, according to his views
as laid out in the Sorbonne speech. His biggest
challenge is to reverse the tide of nationalism
spread throughout Europe in order for the next