THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
54
UK’s withdrawal on the EU as an inverse consti-
tutional political process diametrically opposed
to the process of EU enlargement).
As stated on innumerable occasions, much
of the complexity of the negotiations now un-
derway stems from their novelty: both of the
parties involved are immersed in a process
fraught with uncertainties and consequences
that neither has had to deal with before. Given
the brevity of Article 50 of the TEU, which fo-
cuses strictly on procedural aspects of negotia-
tions on the conditions of a Member State’s
withdrawal and is admittedly ambiguous on
certain points, negotiations are being conduct-
ed on the basis of European Council guidelines
and experience accumulated along the way. As
these talks have progressed, they have proved
to have numerous aspects in common with the
two other EU constitutional processes: enlarge-
ment and deepening, the most important of
which is the limited scope of changes they allow
and the fact not everything being open to nego-
tiation.
Optimal management of the Brexit
process: a matter of survival for the EU
It is abundantly clear to everyone involved that
the UK’s withdrawal is of enormous importance
to the EU and its Member States, including
Spain, for a number of reasons. Two are par-
ticularly worth mentioning for the insight they
provide into various aspects of the negotiation
process.
The first is that the victory of the Brexit camp
in the 2016 referendum has plunged the Union
into a four-pronged existential crisis: it has not
only deflated the mythical narrative of the irre-
versibility and perceived value of integration,
but also brutally demonstrated that citizens are
quite capable of turning their backs on the EU if
it doesn’t live up to its promises, brought us face
to face with the destructive power of populism
and politics grounded in the manipulation of
public emotions rather than rational analysis
and, last but not least, has established a danger-
ous precedent, which, if not adequately ad-
dressed, could lead to an exodus of other
Member States and the unravelling or dilution
of European integration. Optimal management
of the Brexit process on the part of EU institu-
tions and Member States alike will therefore be
key to ensuring the survival of the European in-
tegration project.
The second reason is that the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU, however it eventually plays
out, has, and will continue to have, wide-
sweeping commercial, economic and political
consequences for the Union as a whole and
each of its Member States. This has become pa-
tently clear from the institutional restructuring
already underway at the European level and in
a number of Member States in preparation for,
and in anticipation of, the changes that Brexit
will suppose
3
.
The immediate issue of concern is the eco-
nomic cost of separation, which will affect the
UK most at the outset but will also have greater
or lesser consequences for remaining Member
States as well
4
. The price all will pay will greatly
depend on whether withdrawal takes place by
3
EU negotiator Michel Barnier has openly acknowledged
to the press that the EU is drawing up plans for a no-deal
scenario in which Great Britain leaves the Union without an
agreement. Zalan, E.: “EU preparing for Brexit failure, Barnier
says”,
Politico,
13 November 2018,
https://euobserver.com/ uk-referendum/139842(Retrieved 2 April 2018).
4
Regarding this question, see: Sampson, T.: “Brexit: The
Economics of International Disintegration”,
Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives,
vol. 31, No. 4, 2017, pp. 163-184.